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About this Report 
Quantum cryptographic technology (QCT) is expected to be a fundamental 
technology for realizing long-term information security even against 
as-yet-unknown future technologies. More advanced security could be achieved 
using QCT together with contemporary cryptographic technologies. To develop and 
spread the use of QCT, it is necessary to standardize devices, protocols, and security 
requirements and thus enable interoperability in a multi-vendor, multi-network, and 
multi-service environment. This report is a technical summary of QCT and related 
topics from the viewpoints of 
 
1. consensual establishment of specifications and requirements of QCT for 
standardization and commercialization and 
2. the promotion of research and design to realize New-Generation Quantum 
Cryptography. 
 
Here, QCT includes cryptographic protocols and related technologies that use the 
laws of quantum mechanics. 
This report comprises four parts. 
 
Part I: Status and Trends of QCT and Related Topics, including a tutorial for those 
not familiar with concepts used in the field. 
Part II: Consensual Building of Specifications and Requirements of QCT for 
Standardization and Commercialization, providing an organizational plan for basic 
concepts as well as challenging issues. 
Part III: Toward New Generation Quantum Cryptography, addressing how to 
achieve innovation in information and communications technology by combining 
QCT with photonic network technology, and presenting challenging issues and 
effective crosscutting approaches. 
Part IV: Summary, including an implementation plan and organization proposal. 
 
We make three additional comments about the report. 
 
1. The Updating Quantum Cryptography Working Group (UQCWG) continues to 
edit/revise this report, basically in accordance with the international conference 
of Updating Quantum Cryptography. 
2. The UQCWG makes an effort to reflect a wide range of expert advice in the report, 
and will make the report available to the public when completed (not necessarily 
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in a perfect form). 
3. The contents of this report can be used or cited either partially or in full in any 
other proposal documents by public organizations/projects in countries of the 
contributors. The report may be translated for such purposes if the UQCWG is 
properly cited. The copyright belongs to the UQC steering committee.  
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Part I: Status and Trends of QCT 
I – 1 Concepts and Principles 
 
Contemporary cryptographic technologies rely on huge computational cost or the 
presumed difficulty of mathematical problems. Their security is guaranteed only by 
algorithms, which are almost always used in the application layer. Security is 
always threatened by new technologies such as the increasing power of computers, 
new mathematical algorithms, and new cryptanalysis techniques. For example, the 
current RSA1024 scheme will cease to work around the year 2015, when super 
computers will be able to factorize composite numbers of 1024 bits into their primes. 
The current scheme needs to be updated to use doubled key-length (RSA2048), 
which would indeed be a tedious task for various systems.  
Quantum cryptography provides security using the laws of quantum mechanics. 
Currently, several types of protocols of quantum key distribution (QKD) and 
quantum-noise randomized cipher (QNRC) have been established. Some QKD 
protocols have been certified by proofs of unconditional security; specifically, 
information-theoretic security protocols have been confirmed to be resistant to any 
possible attack. In information-theoretic security, the amount of information leaked 
to an eavesdropper can be made arbitrarily small as the key length or code length is 
increased. No future technology can break such security. Such protocols provide 
long-term security and especially conform to the demands of national information 
security, secure and confidential communication by financial entities, and any 
mission-critical applications for which a security breach of encoded data could be a 
disaster not covered by an insurance mechanism.  
Other QKD protocols are still under investigation in terms of proof of their 
complete security. They are, however, known to be already secure against very 
advanced technologies that will not be realized for a few decades yet.  
Quantum cryptography uses optical communication channels that are governed 
by the laws of quantum mechanics. The practical security level directly depends on 
the physical conditions of implementation. This is in sharp contrast to contemporary 
cryptography, for which the security level is merely determined by an algorithm. 
This particular feature of quantum cryptography requires certification methods that 
are somewhat different from those for conventional cryptoschemes in providing 
users with practical solutions. In quantum cryptography, there are generally 
trade-offs between the practical security level and implementation cost. Analysis of 
quantum cryptography is more involved and must be a central issue in the 
certification and standardization of quantum cryptography.  
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1. QKD 
QKD protocols are schemes that expand a secret key among two players while 
maintaining information-theoretic security for the key. These protocols enable the 
two players to terminate their protocols when they detect intrusion using the 
quantum uncertainty principle. Such an extremely secure key could be used in 
various data encryptions, but the most attractive scenario at present is to realize 
information-theoretic secure private communications between two players applying 
the secret key to a one-time pad (OTP) scheme, which requires entropy of the secret 
key as much as that of the message.  
To implement QKD protocols in practice, we need devices that are not familiar to 
current optical networks such as single-photon detectors and sources of extremely 
weak coherent pulses (WCPs) and entangled photons. In addition, the security of 
such protocols is guaranteed by information-theoretic security based on physical 
(quantum mechanical) properties of the channel. These protocols are very different 
from contemporary cryptographic protocols based on complexity-theoretic security 
and mathematical algorithms. While these processes result in the superiority and 
uniqueness of QKD, one has to newly formalize its concepts and specifications from 
both the viewpoints of security and device requirements.  
 
2. QNRC 
A QNRC is a physical-layer data encryption scheme that uses quantum noise to 
randomize the observed output of a cipher. The goal of implementing a QNRC is to 
realize a practical random cipher system. A random cipher is an extended version of 
a standard cipher where cipher text is further randomized by a random variable that 
is unknown to both a receiver, Bob, and an eavesdropper, Eve. In contrast to a 
standard random cipher for which a sender, Alice, generates random numbers 
artificially, a QNRC utilizes quantum noise as an automatic source of random 
numbers. The latter is practically attractive since it is a truly physical randomness 
and the transmission can be as fast as the communications system (i.e., not limited 
by a random-number generation rate). The noise produced using this technique is 
not necessarily quantum mechanical, and thus the protocol itself has a wider 
flexibility in its implementation. Indeed, the required physical technologies for a 
typical protocol of a QNRC, called Y00 or , are almost compatible with current 
optical network infrastructures.  
Quantitative security analysis of QNRCs is, however, still under investigation. 
In practice, it is expected that the additional randomness provides complexity- 
theoretic security better than that of conventional ciphers. Therefore, we can almost 
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use the security notions of conventional ciphers for those of QNRCs. 
It should be emphasized that a QNRC is a data encryption protocol (that uses a 
seed key) while QKD is a protocol to distribute a key itself. Therefore, QKD and 
QNRCs are not competing technologies and are being pursued independently. 
 
I – 2 Achievements 
 
I – 2 – 1 Theories 
 
1. QKD protocols and their security proofs 
 
Inspired by an idea of Wiesner, the first QKD protocol was proposed and 
published in 1984 by Bennett and Brassard [Bennett and Brassard, 1984]. This 
protocol is designed to securely distribute a secret key between two parties, and this 
secret key is to be used in OTP encryption [Vernam, 1926]. Thus, using this QKD 
protocol (BB84), we expect the realization of very secure communications. BB84 uses 
four single-photon polarization states belonging to two conjugate bases, say the Z 
and Y bases for spin. Since the proposal of BB84, many QKD protocols have been 
proposed.  
In 1991, Ekert considered a protocol for which the security is based on a violation 
of Bell‘s inequality [Ekert, 1991]. In this protocol (E91), each of two legitimate 
parties share a part of an entangled photon-pair and makes a measurement on each 
photon with bases randomly chosen from three bases. The intrinsic quantum 
correlation of the photon-pair allows the two parties to share the key. The basic idea 
for preventing eavesdropping is as follows. Imagine that Eve makes a measurement 
of the particles and resends states. This eavesdropping introduces the so-called 
physical reality to the spin measurement and this reality is detected via a test based 
on Bell‘s inequality. In 1992, Bennett, Brassard, and Mermin applied the concept of 
E91 to BB84. Each party performs the same measurement as Bob does in BB84; i.e., 
each party randomly chooses the Z or Y basis for the measurement [Bennett et al., 
1992b]. This protocol is referred to as BBM92, and both E91 and BBM92 rely on 
entanglement for their security.  
Also in 1992, Bennett proposed another important protocol, referred to as B92 
[Bennett, 1992]. Unlike E91 and BBM92, this protocol does not directly use 
entanglement as the security basis. Since B92 uses only two nonorthogonal states, it 
is the simplest protocol. Note that any two nonorthogonal states can be 
unambiguously discriminated with some probability. It follows that the use of 
single-photon polarization as the encoding media cannot achieve long distances since 
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Eve can exploit channel losses in such a way that she sends the vacuum state when 
she fails to identify the states. Thus, in order to cover long distances, we need an 
auxiliary system that detects the suppression of signals. For this purpose, Bennett 
proposed the use of strong reference light together with two signal lights.  
BB84 and B92 seem to suggest that the use of nonorthogonal states is the essence 
of the security; however, this is not always the case. Goldenberg and Vaidman 
proposed a protocol that uses two orthogonal states [Goldenberg and Vaidman, 1995]. 
This state is a two-mode state, and the point is that Alice sends the signal in such a 
way that Eve cannot have access simultaneously to both modes. In this manner, 
Alice prevents Eve from free access to the information.  
With the increase in interest in QKD, researchers have attempted to implement 
QKD protocols in practice. Because of its relative simplicity, BB84 was widely 
demonstrated experimentally. A major problem in the implementation of BB84 is 
how one prepares a single-photon state. In most experiments, an attenuated 
coherent light source is used instead of a perfect single-photon source while some 
works have been devoted to the creation of a perfect single-photon source. However, 
all photon sources so far have some probability of multi-photon emission, from which 
Eve can obtain information freely by exploiting the so-called photon number 
splitting (PNS) attack [Brassard et al., 2000]. Since this attack is one of the greatest 
threats to BB84, protocols with PNS tolerance have been considered. The differential 
phase shift (DPS)-QKD [Inoue et al., 2002; Inoue et al., 2003], SARG04 protocol 
[Scarani and Aćin, 2004], and decoy state method [Hwang, 2003; Lo et al., 2005; 
Wang, 2005] are examples of such protocols or PNS-attack-resistant methods.  
What we described in the previous paragraph is a good example of how theorists 
and experimentalists collaborate, and it also suggests that it is very important to 
consider particularly threatening attacks.  On the other hand, to analyze whether a 
QKD protocol is secure against any eavesdropping, i.e., unconditionally secure, is 
also very important task in the theoretical research in QKD. The first unconditional 
security proof for BB84 was presented by Mayers in 1996 [Mayers, 1996]. In the 
proof, Alice is assumed to have a perfect single-photon source while Bob has 
threshold detectors. This proof was generalized by Inamori, Lütkenhaus, and 
Mayers [Inamori et al., 2001] to accommodate the use of a coherent light source. 
Since these security proofs provide insights into security in a complicated manner, 
works have been devoted to simplifying these insights. One successful simple 
security proof is based on the distillation of a maximally entangled state 
(entanglement distillation protocol), which was proposed by Lo and Chau in 1998 [Lo 
and Chau, 1998] and Shor and Preskill in 2000 [Shor and Preskill, 2000]. The proof 
by Lo and Chau assumed possession of a quantum computer, and this assumption 
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was later removed in the proof by Shor and Preskill, who assumed a perfect 
single-photon source and photon-number-resolving detectors. Because of the 
simplicity of the proof based on the entanglement distillation protocol, the proof was 
generalized, mainly in three directions. First, the achievable distance of secure 
communication, for instance, was increased by considering two-way classical 
communications [Gottesman and Lo, 2003]. Second, imperfections such as 
multi-photon emissions and the use of a threshold detector were taken into account 
[Koashi and Preskill, 2003; Gottesman et al., 2004; Tsurumaru and Tamaki, 2008; 
Koashi et al., 2008; Beaudry et al., 2008]. Third, the proof was applied to other 
protocols such as B92 [Tamaki et al., 2003; Tamaki and Lütkenhaus, 2004; Koashi, 
2004; Tamaki et al., 2006], the three-state protocol [Phoenix et al., 2000; Boileau et 
al., 2005], and SARG04 [Tamaki and Lo, 2006]. We note that all these 
generalizations are important since they are useful in increasing the communication 
distance, thus making QKD more practical, and indicating which protocol should be 
used on the basis of experimental parameters. In 2005, the proof was further 
simplified by Koashi, who considered the distillation of the eigenstate of a qubit 
instead of the maximally entangled state [Koashi, 2005]. Though we do not know yet 
whether this proof can accommodate the use of two-way classical communication, 
the proof has advantages in terms of the bit error rate threshold and simplicity in 
treating the imperfections of devices.  
Another important security proof that is not based on the distillation of a pure 
state but on an information-theoretic concept was presented by Kraus, Gisin, and 
Renner [Kraus et al., 2005]. This security proof can also be applied to protocols such 
as B92 and SARG04. One of the striking features of this proof is that it rigorously 
shows that if Bob applies appropriate noise intentionally to the data (a process 
referred to as post-processing), then the bit error rate threshold increases. This is 
the first formal proof of an intuition that in some situations adding noise on Bob‘s 
side may disturb more correlation between Eve and Bob than the one between Alice 
and Bob, which is advantageous to Alice and Bob.  
Finally, Horodecki et al. [Horodecki et al., 2005] showed that QKD can be based 
on underlying entanglement concepts without the actual distilling of the 
entanglement, and thus the secret key can also be obtained from the so-called bound 
entangled states, which cannot be distilled in principle.  
So far, we have discussed only discrete variable QKD where a single-photon level 
detection is required. This detection is technologically difficult, and a scheme 
involving the measurement of the continuous data, i.e., amplitude of the light, by 
using homodyne detection was proposed by Ralph in 1999 [Ralph, 1999], Hillery in 
2000 [Hillery, 2000], and Reid in 2000 [Reid, 2000]. These protocols and their 
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generalized version are called continuous variable (CV) QKD since Bob‘s raw data is 
continuous. In these protocols, Alice encodes her bit data by performing phase or 
amplitude displacement of a light pulse. When the phase-space displacement values 
(in the complex plane) are discrete, this family of CV protocols is called CV QKD 
with discrete modulation. On the other hand, there is another family of CV QKDs, 
the CV QKD with Gaussian modulation where the signal amplitude is modulated 
according to Gaussian distribution in quadratures x or p. This kind of QKD was 
proposed by Cerf, Lévy, and Van Assche in 2001 [Cerf et. al., 2001], using squeezed 
states of light, and by Grosshans and Grangier in 2002 [Grosshans and Grangier, 
2002], using coherent states. 
The first experimental demonstration of CVQKD was carried out by Grosshans et 
al in 2003 [Grosshans et al., 2003], using an improved protocol called ―reverse 
reconciliation‖, which allows in principle to distribute a key through a line with 
arbitrary losses. It was shown also that CV QKD may involve either homodyne 
detection or heterodyne detection, which makes it fast and efficient [Lance et al., 
2005]. These features are considered to be one of the advantages over discrete 
variable QKD. Examples of up-to-date CVQKD setups with Gaussian modulation, 
able to distribute keys in an automated way within a secure network, are given in 
[Lodewyck et al., 2007] and [Fossier et al., 2008]. As pointed out by Silberhorn et al 
[Silberhorn et al., 2002], the discrete modulation schemes can operate also beyond 
3dB channel loss, and by a combination of post-selection mechanisms and practical 
one- or two-way error correction they can be made stable for real implementations. 
Although practical CV QKD is relatively newly proposed, its security has rapidly 
been investigated. Many works have been devoted aiming to prove the unconditional 
security of CV QKD. The first practical protocol [Grosshans et al., 2003] was proven 
secure against individual Gaussian attacks. The proof was quickly extended to 
arbitrary individual attacks [Grosshans and Cerf, 2004], and then to arbitrary 
collective attacks [Navasques et al., 2006; Garcıa-Patron and Cerf, 2006]. Novel 
protocols, designed to increase the transmission distance, were also proposed for 
example by Leverrier and Grangier in 2008 [Leverrier and Grangier, 2008] or Zhao, 
Han, and Guo in 2008 [Zhao et al., 2008]. 
Finally, it was proven by Renner and Cirac in 2009 [Renner and Cirac, 2009] that 
coherent attacks are in the asymptotic limit not more powerful than collective 
attacks, establishing the unconditional security of CVQKD protocols based on the 
Gaussian optimality theorem [Cirac et al., 2006]. It should be pointed out that this 
theorem is not applicable to the protocols using post-selection, which are thus not 
proven fully secure so far. 
As we have seen, the theory of QKD is rapidly growing area, and it is not only 
UQC Report version 1 
 
 
 
12 
about making new proposals to experimentalists but also receiving feedbacks from 
them in order to give back them new proposals to relax the constraints of devices or 
to enhance the achievable distances. Thus, by interacting each other, 
experimentalists and theorists are working together to close the gap between theory 
and experiment. 
 
2. QNRC 
 
The first discussion on the possibility of data encryption via quantum noise 
randomization was initiated by a protocol proposed by Yuen in 2000 [Yuen, 2003] 
called Y00 or . In addition to Y00 being the first data encryption protocol based on 
quantum mechanics, it is attractive from a practical viewpoint since it uses 
relatively strong coherent states (more than a single-photon level) and a homodyne 
detector, which is faster and more efficient than photon counters.  
After discussions on its security issues, nowadays the Y00-based data encryption 
protocol is recognized as a QNRC protocol [Nair et al., 2006]. A QNRC is a physical 
layer data encryption that uses quantum noise to randomize the observed output of 
a cipher. It is based on the (classical) random cipher. In contrast to standard ciphers, 
random ciphers use an additional random variable R in addition to an initially 
shared key, where R is generated by Alice, known to only her, and used in data 
encryption. The randomization is done such that Bob can decrypt his received cipher 
using only the shared key, while it acts as inevitable noise for Eve. This additional R 
increases the security of ciphers (in practice, computational cost required for Eve). 
However, the implementation of the proposed random ciphers faces a large obstacle 
owing to a reduction in the data rate. Moreover, a true and high-speed random 
number generator (RNG) is hardly obtainable at present.  
A QNRC provides a practical high-speed (in excess of gigabits per second) random 
cipher in the physical layer. In Y00 and related protocols, the additional randomness 
is effectively provided by quantum noise in an optical pulse instead of by Alice‘s RNG. 
Due to the law of quantum mechanics, quantum noise cannot be perfectly removed. 
Thus, properly choosing the physical signal modulation format, quantum noise acts 
as the random variable R. Compared with using artificial RNGs, quantum noise has 
two advantages: it provides truly physical randomness and it realizes high-speed 
operation. (Since quantum noise is automatically embedded in every mode of optical 
signals, the data rate is not limited by the speed of random number generation.) In 
addition, the physical system and devices required for the implementation of Y00 are 
almost compatible with current optical network infrastructure and devices. In the 
total system, quantum-noise-based randomization is combined with contemporary 
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data encryptions such as the advanced encryption standard (AES). Therefore, 
quantum noise randomized symmetric ciphers (QNRSCs) might be practical.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quantitative security analyses of QNRSCs have not yet produced clear results. 
Obviously, the security of a QNRSC protocol is equivalent to that of a certain class of 
classical random symmetric cipher. Therefore, the security analysis can be mostly 
conducted using the theory of contemporary ciphers, and it is highly desirable to 
establish the practical theory clarifying how large the difference in security is 
between random and nonrandom symmetric ciphers. Once such theory is developed, 
one could be estimate the security of QNRSCs quantitatively by incorporating Eve‘s 
physical attacks based on quantum mechanical processes. 
 
I – 2 – 2 Experiments 
 
This section briefly reviews progress on the experimental realization of quantum 
cryptography. The present review does not provide a complete list of experimental 
achievements, but traces steps made toward the realization of practical quantum 
cryptographic systems.  
 
1. QKD 
 
Steps toward practical QKD systems 
Experimental studies in QKD is typically advanced by taking a few conceptual 
steps. First, proof-of-principle experiments show that the signals can really be 
transmitted while maintaining their quantum mechanical characteristics. In QKD 
experiments for example, interference or successful transmission of a coherent 
X
Y=E(X;K) D(Y;K)
X
Alice Bob
X
Y=E(X;K,R) D(Y;K)
X
Alice Bob
Eve
Eve
X
Y=E(X;K) D(Y;K)
X
Alice Bob
Eve
Cipher
Random Cipher
Quantum Noise 
Randomized Cipher
X: plaintext
Y: ciphertext
K: shared key
R: random variable
E(·): encryption
D(·): decryption
Quantum noise
(effective R)
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superposition of photons is demonstrated. For this purpose, it suffices to transmit 
sequences of identical fixed states. In a next step, key transmission first with a fixed 
pattern, and then with a randomly selected sequence is performed to include 
dynamical effects of the system. The transmission and detection of signals is, 
however, only half of the task; the transmission needs to be followed by 
post-processing. Post-processing guarantees the security of the implemented 
protocol, which should be supported by an appropriate theory with reasonable 
assumptions.  This sequence of steps describes the historical development of QKD, 
but it is at the same time the meaningful path of steps in implementing and testing 
novel QKD implementations. 
Along with the progress in key transmission and post processing, the system 
control needs to be integrated with some steps for the QKD experiment to turn into a 
QKD application. First, the transmitter and receiver may work with a clock signal 
from the same clock oscillator, typically meaning that sender and receiver have to sit 
in a laboratory side to side. Then, isolated clock generators need to be implemented, 
along with a proper clock synchronization function. To obtain a correct key in 
practical system, real-time frame synchronization should be also implemented. A 
proto-type of the QKD system will then also require a fault detection-recovery 
mechanism. The proto-type will be sophisticated to a commercial point-to-point QKD 
system, when for the classical post-processing protocols are protected by a properly 
implemented authentication function.  
 
Transmission and post-processing 
The QKD protocol was first demonstrated in 1992 [Bennett et al., 1992a]. The 
transmission distance was only 30 cm. Since then, experimental research has mainly 
focused on improving transmission performances, such as increasing the 
communication distance and key-generation rate. The first step to long-distance 
QKD transmission might be the use of optical fibers. It was not clear whether an 
optical fiber conserves the coherence of a single photon after transmission of several 
tens of kilometers in the early state. Muller et al. performed a remarkable 
demonstration in which the polarization state of a single photon was conserved 
through an optical fiber cable installed under a lake [Muller et al., 1996]. Since 
polarization states are easily altered by strain acting on optical fibers, phase coding 
has been proposed. Single-photon transmission through a 10 km optical fiber was 
demonstrated [Townsend, 1994]. Currently, QKD transmission through a 202 km 
optical fiber (the effective length is shorter: 148.7 km for = 0.1 and 184.6 km for = 
0.5) has been reported using an extremely low dark noise photon detector [Hiskett et 
al., 2006]. Recently, long-distance QKD experiments have been reported using 
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installed fiber links: 67 km transmission in Switzerland in 2002 [Stucki et al., 2002], 
96 km in Japan in 2005 [Hasegawa et al., 2005], and 125 km in China in 2005 [Mo et 
al., 2005]. 
Along with the long distance transmission, the clock frequency has been 
increased for high-speed key generation. In early experiments, the clock frequency 
was about 1 MHz owing to the afterpulse effect in avalanche photodiode (APD) 
photon detectors. Recently, a 625 MHz clock has been used in a QKD system with 
fast superconducting single-photon detectors (SSPDs) [Tanaka et al., 2008]. If the 
photon detection rate is not too high, an APD-based QKD system can also operate 
with a gigahertz clock frequency [Yuan et al., 2008]. Another figure of merit of the 
single-photon detector is the timing jitter, which is especially important for a very 
high clock frequency system (~10 GHz). SSPDs show superior timing jitter to other 
single photon detectors.  
Free-space QKD systems have also been improved in transmission performances. 
One of the main targets of the free-space QKD system for free-space transmission is 
to construct an Earth–satellite link. The system should support high-speed 
transmission over a long distance between the earth and a satellite, since allowable 
communication time will be only a few minutes. In free-space systems, bits are 
encoded in polarization states, which are conserved in the air. The atmospheric 
transmission window enables us to use visible light, and thus a high-performance 
Si-APD can be applied to free-space QKD systems. QKD transmission was 
demonstrated even in daytime in 2000 [Buttler et al., 2000]. A QKD demonstration 
was successful over 144 km [Schmitt-Manderbach et al., 2007]. Operations with high 
clock frequencies have also been investigated in the gigahertz range [Bienfang et al., 
2004].  
Experimental studies have focused on generating keys with low quantum bit 
error rates (QBERs) and examined the security of the generated key with the 
criteria derived for ideal systems. The security in real systems has been considered 
only recently. A decoy method has been implemented to increase the final key rate 
[Zhao et al., 2006; Peng et al., 2007; Yuan et al., 2007; Rosenberg et al., 2007] of the 
system using a dimmed laser as a light source. Recently, theoretical investigations 
were conducted to estimate the effect of statistical variation in finite-length data. It 
has been shown that careful estimation of the number of sacrifice bits is necessary to 
guarantee the security of the finite-length code. Secure key distillation has been 
implemented by taking account of the effect of the finite-length code [Hasegawa et 
al., 2007; Scarani and Renner, 2008].  
The above QKD systems are intended to implement the BB84 protocol. High 
transmission performances have been reported in DPS-QKD systems [Diamanti et 
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al., 2006; Takesue et al., 2007] that employ either a 1 GHz clock frequency with a 
frequency up-conversion single-photon detector or a 10 GHz clock with a SSPD. 
Entanglement-based QKD systems have been implemented for fiber 
transmission [Jennewein et al., 2000; Tittel et al., 2000] and free-space transmission 
[Naik et al., 2000; Ursin et al., 2007; Erven et al., 2008]. Recently, a modified E91 
protocol has been demonstrated, where the information obtained by the 
eavesdropper was estimated from the violation of the CHSH Bell equation [Ling et 
al., 2008].  
A CV-QKD system consisting of a coherent state with Gaussian modulation and 
homodyne detection has also been investigated for fiber channels. Recently, a higher 
generation rate of the secret key over a relatively short distance (1.5 kbps, 25 km) 
has been achieved [Lodewyck et al., 2007], with the generation rate being limited 
simply by the computer speed. Implementation of a plug-and-play CV-QKD with 
discrete modulation and homodyne detection has also been examined [Hirano et al., 
2006]. 
 
Implementation, system control, and security 
Phase coding BB84 systems require two asymmetric Mach–Zehnder 
interferometers to create a coherent double-pulse for encoding and to generate 
interference between the double-pulse for decoding. The two interferometers should 
have identical path differences to obtain interference with high visibility. A 
plug-and-play system solves this issue using the same interferometer for encoding 
and decoding in the round-trip architecture [Muller et al., 1997]. The plug-and-play 
system provides stable operation using conventional optical devices without precise 
control of the interferometer. A number of QKD systems including commercial 
systems (idQuantique and MagiQ) employ the plug-and-play architecture. However, 
the plug-and-play systems suffer from back scattering light owing to their round-trip 
architecture. Burst operation can reduce the back scattering noise with the cost of 
decreasing the operation throughput to one-third, which limits the high-speed key 
generation. It has been pointed that the plug-and-play system is vulnerable to 
Trojan-horse attack. This system also reveals a phase reference, which may allow 
more efficient eavesdropping. Therefore, one-way architecture is revived with 
stabilizing techniques. One technique is the active control of the interferometer 
[Yuan and Shields, 2005]; another is the use of planar lightwave circuits (PLCs) 
[Nambu et al., 2004]. A PLC is an integrated optical circuit that is mechanically 
stable with a small footprint. The interference can be maintained only with 
temperature control. A DPS-QKD system simplifies the requirement of the 
interferometer; only one interferometer is needed in the decoder, the path difference 
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of which is adjusted to the period of the coherent optical pulse train. A PLC is also 
useful in DPS-QKD systems. One of the important aspects of security is to avoid 
using active devices since they may cause security loopholes that can be used by 
Trojan-horse attack. The simple setup of a DPS-QKD system using only passive 
devices might be another merit. 
Currently, a single-photon source is becoming a less crucial component of a QKD 
system; however, it is still useful in simplifying the protocol. A QKD system with a 
single-photon source operating at 1310 nm has been demonstrated [Intallura et al., 
2007]. A single-photon source operating at 1550 nm has also been reported 
[Miyazaki et al., 2005]. An alternative device, the heralded single-photon source, was 
used for QKD transmission [Soujaeff et al., 2007]. 
A practical communication system should contain function blocks for the clock 
synchronization, frame synchronization, and fault detection/recovery to ensure 
stable operation. A system equipped with the above functions provided continuous 
hands-free operation over 14 days through an aerially installed optical fiber link. 
Continuous operation was also reported [Tanaka et al., 2005; Tajima et al., 2007]. 
Recently, the Development of a Global Network for Secure Communication based on 
Quantum Cryptography (SECOQC) project demonstrated the continuous operation 
of QKD systems connected with an optical fiber network in Vienna [Poppe et al., 
2008]. 
 
2. QNRC 
 
Experiments were performed with the intention of implementing the proposed 
protocol with multi-ary phase [Barbosa et al., 2003] and amplitude modulations 
[Hirota et al., 2005], and successful encoding–decoding was reported. Since the 
device and system requirements of these protocols are almost compatible with (or 
slightly severer than) current photonic network technologies, some prototypes for 
commercialization have already been successfully demonstrated; e.g., by NuCrypt 
(phase shift keying data transmission, 2.5 Gbps, 210 km) [NuCrypt, 2007] and 
Hitachi Info & Communication Engineering (amplitude shift keying video 
transmission, 2.5 Gbps, 50 km) [Hitachi, 2007]. 
 
I – 3 Examples of Practical Applications and Commercial Products 
 
Quantum cryptography is no longer a subject reserved to scientists, but is 
becoming a practical solution for secure communications in the real world. There are 
already black-box commercial products available that are easy to use. Indeed, QKD 
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has been applied by nonspecialists to secure communications.  
During the Swiss federal elections in the fall of 2007, the information technology 
department of the Geneva government used id Quantique‘s Cerberis encryption 
system with QKD to secure the network processing of voting results. The system was 
used to secure a gigabit Ethernet link connecting the central counting station 
located in downtown Geneva and the data center where all the results were stored 
and processed (see map below). The system ran perfectly during the elections. This 
was the world's first application of quantum cryptography. Following this successful 
pilot project, the chancellery of the canton of Geneva decided to acquire a Cerberis 
solution and rely on quantum cryptography for all future elections. 
 
 
(From http://www.idquantique.com/news/news-elections2008.htm) 
 
Some commercial QKD products have already been rolled out. Three 
representative products from idQunatique, MagiQ Technologies, and 
SmartQuantum are now introduced. 
 
idQuantique 
idQuantique is the first company to launch a QKD system as a commercial 
product. The latest product is the id3100/id3110 Clavis2 QKD system, which 
supports BB84 and SARG04 protocols. An autocompensating interferometric 
plug-and-play system is adopted. Cerberis is a network security solution comprising 
Clasvis2 and a contemporary encryption engine Centauris. The price of Clavis2 is 
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about US$150,000–200,000. 
 
Cerberis 
(From http://www.idquantique.com/) 
 
MagiQ Technologies 
MagiQ Technologies is another pioneer of QKD commercial products. The QKD 
system NAVAJO Security Gateway was launched in 2003 as a virtual private 
network solution. Recently, MagiQ Technologies promoted MagiQ QPN as a 
quantum cryptographic solution and proposed several solutions using QPN security 
gateways. The price of NAVAJO Security Gateway is US$200,000–400,000. 
 
QPN Security Gateway 
(From http://www.magiqtech.com/) 
 
SmartQuantum 
SmartQuantum also provides a QKD solution, the SQKey Generator. SQBox 
Defender was selected as one of the best innovative products at the Eurosatory 
exhibition (an international defense exhibition) in June 2008. 
 
 
SQKey Generator 
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(From http://www.smartquantum.com/SmartQuantum.html) 
 
The main specifications of the above three products are given in the following table.  
 
Specifications of commercial products 
Product Clavis2 NAVAJO Security 
Gateway 
SQKey Generator 
Vendor idQuantique MagiQ 
Technologies, Inc. 
SmartQauntum 
Inc. 
Protocol BB84, SARG BB84 BB84 
Typical 
distance 
50 km 50 km 80 km 
Key refresh 
rate 
1 kbps @ 25 km 100 keys/s one 192-bit key/s 
 
Combining with an OTP, these products support a hybrid system with 
contemporary cryptography and assure high performance compared with current 
optical communication. The three vendors recently promoted solutions based on a 
QKD system rather than only a QKD system itself. 
 
I – 4 Potential Applications and Markets 
 
1. Physically secure private network 
 
Many companies and mission-critical organizations have begun wanting their 
own private fiber network, to prevent information leaks and maintain confidentiality. 
Such companies want their network to be physically isolated from the public 
Internet, and intend to manage it themselves instead of relying on network services 
provided by carrier companies.  
Such a network, referred to as a physically secure private network, consists of 
authorized terminals and a secure data center, where confidential data such as 
research and design data and new product design data are stored and centrally 
controlled. The network can be within a campus and hence be contained within a few 
tens of kilometers. The total key consumption per day may not be large because 
encryption is not always required but is used only for highly confidential data 
transmission and backup transmission, which may occur a limited number of times 
a day.  
The current level of QKD would thus suffice and be an appropriate solution for 
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secure communications in such a physically secure private network. This kind of 
private network could be demanded by every type of industry, social service, and 
business. This could act as a strong impetus to the standardization of QKD.  
 
 
2. Random number sharing between mobile terminals  
 
The security of e-commerce, and hence its user acceptance, depends critically 
upon asymmetric cryptography to perform user authentication and to safely 
transmit session keys. This form of encryption depends upon having a number of 
trapdoor (one-way) function operations that are prohibitively expensive for the 
uninformed to perform, but inexpensive for the informed. There is, however, a risk in 
that such systems can be broken. There is one type of cryptography that has been 
around for many years, the OTP, that is guaranteed to be secure whatever the 
advances in physics, computer science, and mathematics. The problem, then, is 
creating two identical copies of an OTP, with each party being given one of the copies. 
There are many ways of achieving this. Quantum physics provides a solution to the 
problem of distribution. The shared secret is generated using QKD. The shared 
secret is then merged into the existing identical copies of the OTP owned by both 
parties. 
Existing QKD technology provides for secure (backbone) network infrastructure 
and but not for the mobile user. Current trends in consumer electronics indicate the 
move to small highly portable devices, for which traditional QKD infrastructure 
schemes will be unusable. The issue then becomes how one can securely get OTP 
material onto a consumer device such as a phone or personal digital assistant (PDA). 
Several groups have implemented a low-cost free-space short-range (less than 1 m) 
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QKD system between an individual and a network base station (for instance, 
Hewlett Packard and the University of Bristol) with the total operation time being 
on the order of 1 s. Such systems are based on a weak pulse BB84 implementation 
and require the Alice unit to be quite inexpensive (a few dollars at most, so light 
emitting diodes are used instead of laser diodes). In fact, the Alice units in this 
system are also heavily constrained in terms of available power and processing 
power. Bob is typically much more powerful than Alice and is a fixed infrastructure. 
Typically there will be many Alice units to one Bob unit. 
Once it has been established securely, the OTP can be used or consumed as 
needed (not necessarily at the time of generation). In the classic application of the 
encryption of messages, the used OTP is destroyed. However, the OTP has other 
uses: 
- Some of the OTP may be revealed, and discarded, to identify the user; e.g., a 
single sign on, entry to a building, and proof of identity to a bank. This 
revelation may be performed using a system such as Bluetooth. Some of the OTP 
could be used as a one-time pin number for e-commerce on the Internet. This 
does not require quantum technology at all. The generation of the OTP and its 
consumption are completely independent. 
- Documents may be bulk-encrypted using an AES, or equivalent, and the key is 
obtained by consuming some of the OTP. 
- The user might have several OTPs stored in their PDA. This is equivalent to 
having multiple visas in a passport. They reveal content from the appropriate 
visa/pad. If they accidentally reveal data from another pad, then this is not a 
problem because the data are simply random bits. 
In terms of the OTP economy, the OTP periodically gets low. The user goes up to a 
Bob device and uses QKD to top up their personal OTP, one copy of which is stored in 
the PDA or mobile phone. This topping up process is protected using some of the 
existing OTP. Once topped up, daily activities are performed periodically consuming 
the OTP. It should also be noted that shim attacks are detected using QKD. 
Finally, it is difficult to determine the market size for consumer-based QKD, but 
it is potentially large given the number of cell phones and PDAs worldwide, 
especially service-based models. 
 
3. Future vision: a secure photonic network  
 
The number of fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) subscribers has rapidly increased in 
recent years. Triple play services (i.e., fast Internet access, voice over Internet 
protocol (VoIP), and broadcast video) will be provided on all Internet protocol (IP) 
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networks that are now being standardized as next-generation networks (NXGNs). A 
NXGN can be realized by extending the IPv6-based Internet to include VoIP and IP 
multicasting for video distribution. NXGNs are now being deployed, standardized, 
and financed toward the service starting in 2010. Two major issues for realizing 
NXGNs are often addressed: how to compromise between transparency and security, 
and how to provide quality of service (QoS), user authentication, and fairness. As the 
number of terminals and network traffic increase, however, this IP-based network 
will face a limit in flexible extendibility owing to the complexity of the network and 
the huge cost of security assurance.  
To solve such problems, research has begun on a new network paradigm, called 
the new-generation network (NWGN). Network architecture should be studied on 
the basis of requirements for ubiquitous networking and new networking 
technologies such as advanced photonic network technologies. A prototype of an 
NWGN and its standard will be realized in the 2015–2020 time frame. Photonic 
network technology is expected to serve as a platform for NWGN, with various 
applications such as real-time video streaming, multipoint video communication, 
grid computing, digital cinemas, sensor networks, and network games being realized 
by the seamless control of QoS on a so-called photonic transport platform. The key 
technologies of the photonic transport platform are data-granularity-adaptive 
multi-QoS photonic transport, one-hop transparent links, and autonomously 
controlled power-minimum photonic networks.  
QCT should be pursued as one of most promising solutions and be embedded in 
the photonic transport platform. A practical solution should consist of diverse 
methods of combining photonic and quantum technologies to realize security at the 
physical and data layers. This may be referred to as secure photonic network 
technology. For example, not only restricting us to an OTP via QKD, the secure 
symmetric key generated by the QKD can be used as the seed key for a 
contemporary cryptosystem such as an AES, and also for a QNRC to provide 
reasonable solutions based on quantum technology for high data rate secure 
communications. Architectures of such quantum secure networks will be a central 
issue in the next phase of research on quantum cryptography. This is discussed 
again in Part III. 
 
I – 5 Initiatives toward Standardization Activities 
 
1. Initiatives  
 
The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) founded the 
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Industry Specification Group on Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum 
Technologies (QISG) on July 29th, 2008, and is taking the initiative for the 
standardization of QKD. This is the result of the SECOQC project under the Sixth 
Framework Programme of the European Union. The SECOQC consortium 
immediately selected the ETSI QISG concept as the most suitable and feasible 
platform for continuation of their work, and the best and easiest option to transfer 
their results from the FP6-Project SECOQC into standards.  
The ETSI QISG is aimed at successfully transferring quantum cryptography out 
of the controlled and trusted environment of experimental laboratories into the real 
world where business requirements, malevolent attackers, and social and legal 
norms have to be respected. The group is currently still in the building phase, today 
consisting already of some 20 members (global players, small and medium 
enterprises, research institutes, and universities) based on all five continents. 
 
2. Conferences  
 
- Workshop on Quantum Information Technology, London, May 2006  
(NIST/Cambridge-MIT Institute's Quantum Technologies Group) 
- Discussions at LEOS Summer Topicals, Quebec City, July 2006 
- Updating Quantum Cryptography (UQC) 2007, Tokyo, Japan, October 2007 
(IPA, NICT, AIST) 
- Telcordia One-Day Workshop: Moving toward Requirements for Quantum Key 
Distribution (QKD), March 3, 2008 
- The European Telecommunications Standards Institute, Industry Specification 
Group on Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum Technologies (QISG) (kicked 
off on 9 October 2008) 
- Updating Quantum Cryptography (UQC) 2008, Tokyo, Japan, December 2008 
(IPA, NICT, AIST) 
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Part II: Consensual Building of Specifications 
and Requirements of QCT for Standardization 
and Commercialization 
 
The current and future eCommunications market can be described as a 
convergent multimedia market with an increasingly complex structure. Within this 
market, we are faced with unpredictable, sometimes fragmented, market 
development (e.g., open network versus a walled garden approach, intelligent 
networks versus dumb networks) where potential barriers to achieving 
interoperability may be emerging. Additionally, within the present competitive 
environment, the risk of noninteroperability is increasing because of, for example, 
windows of opportunity being small owing to the fast evolution of technology, or the 
use of non-open standards. 
Against this background, there is an ever-increasing awareness on the part of 
market players and regulators that mass-market development requires 
interoperability based on open standards. Additionally, the end user appreciates 
more choice, but expects certainties. 
In a world of converging yet diverse technologies, complex systems must 
communicate and interwork on all levels. This is generally known as interoperability. 
One well-proven and cost-effective approach to achieve interoperable standards, and 
subsequently interoperable products, is the holding of interoperability events. These 
events, which may comprise just a few or many hundreds of participants, draw 
engineers and equipment into a (possibly distributed) neutral environment where 
they can execute a large variety of real-life scenarios in various combinations and 
with different equipment. Successful interoperability events require well-specified 
tests (scenarios) as well as significant logistical and technical support. However, 
once in place, such events, or series of events, are an excellent way to validate 
standards and accelerate standardization. Interoperability events have the 
additional advantages of optimizing the development of implementations and 
providing an open forum for resolving issues of noninteroperability and other 
technical aspects related to the development and validation of standards. 
The main aim of standardization is to enable interoperability in a multi-vendor, 
multi-network, and multi-service environment. Interoperability testing is the 
structured and formal testing of functions supported remotely by two or more items 
of equipment communicating by means of standardized protocols. It is not the 
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detailed verification of protocol requirements specified in a conformance test suite, 
neither is it the less formal development testing often associated with plugfest and 
interop events (frequently referred to as ―bake-offs‖, see <http://www.interop.com/> 
for example). 
When a new Work Item is raised for a technical specification or a harmonized 
standard, it is easy to forget the effort that is needed to validate the standard itself 
to assure the quality of the document and to ensure appropriate test specifications, 
including those of conformance tests. However, they must be available by the time 
the standard is implemented as commercial products. This additional effort is 
rewarded by better standards and the overall improved quality of deliverables. 
 
II – 1 Security Specifications, Protocols, and Requirements for Secure 
Communication 
 
In this section, we give an overview of theoretical aspects of secure 
communications. In section II-1-1, we give basic terminologies that are necessary in 
this section. Next, in section II-1-2, we list up major QKD protocols and quantum 
noise randomized cipher as well as the description of the current status of the 
security of each protocol. In the security analysis, it is important to consider the 
security not only against any attack, but also against limited attacks since 
technological difficulties do not allow us to implement any attack. These limited 
attacks will be described in section II-1-3. In theory, some QKD protocols are shown 
to achieve unconditionally secure communications, however, practically available 
devises may not operate in such a way that the theory assumes them to do. These 
imperfections may be exploited by Eve, and this issue is discussed in section II-1-4. 
Finally, by summarizing the contents from section II-1-1 to II-1-4, we give a 
performance specification table in section II-1-5. 
 
II – 1 – 1 Definitions of Terminologies 
 
1. Definition: protocol 
The term protocol refers to a description of operations at the abstract level that 
achieve a cryptographic task. Particularly for QKD protocols, the description usually 
can be divided into two parts: the first part is quantum communication and the 
second is classical data processing. The quantum communication part usually 
specifies 
- the relative structure of a set of quantum states that are to be transmitted or 
exchanged via a quantum channel, and 
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- the abstract structure of the measurements to be performed by the receiver. 
The classical data processing part usually contains 
- information that is necessary to distill a secret key from the raw data. It 
consists of information for sifting, test bits, parity information for error 
correction, and a hash function for privacy amplification. Information for the 
sifting highly depends on the quantum communication part; i.e., what kinds of 
state sets and measurement sets are chosen.  
 
2. Definition: schemes 
A scheme is defined as a combination of a protocol and the degree of freedom with 
which the abstract signal states and measurements are to be implemented. For 
instance, in the case of information encoding in the BB84 protocol, the abstract 
description of the protocol requires the preparation of four spin-1/2 states: X basis 
eigenstates|0x> and |1x> and Y basis eigenstates|0y> and |1y>. We have several 
choices for the degree of freedom for the physical implementation; i.e., the encoding 
scheme. The first is to encode the states into single-photon polarization states, and a 
second is to use phase encoding. Note that polarization encoding uses two orthogonal 
polarization modes, so the two basis states are those with one photon in either the 
first or second mode. The other signal states are then linear superpositions of these 
states. Similarly, phase encoding uses two orthogonal modes, which correspond to 
two pulses each, separated by some fixed time. Again, one basis might have a photon 
either in the first or in the second time window. Typically, one uses the other two 
bases, where the signal states are equally weighted superpositions of photons in 
each mode. The basis states then differ only in the relative phase between these two 
superposition terms.  
 
3. Definition: security parameters 
Security parameters are defined as parameters describing the degree of the 
security at an abstract level to be used in information-theoretic security 
proofs/analysis. The security parameter is chosen by legitimate users, and an 
example of the security parameter is the number of pulses the sender sends. 
 
4. Definition: unconditional security  
Roughly speaking, unconditional security means that a protocol is secure against 
any possible attacks allowed by the law of quantum mechanics. Here, we give two 
important definitions, the first one is the usual definition of unconditional security 
and the second one is universal composable security. In this report, whenever we 
refer to ―unconditional security‖, it means ―universal composable security‖. 
UQC Report version 1 
 
 
 
28 
 
 Usual definition of unconditional security 
QKD is unconditionally secure if the following condition is satisfied. For any 
attack made by Eve, the protocol aborts or succeeds with a high probability 
)2(1 sO  , and it is guaranteed that the resulting key is random and Eve‘s 
mutual information with the key is less than )2( lO  . Here, s and l are security 
parameters that Alice and Bob can choose.  
 
 Universal composable security [Ben-Or et al., 2005; Renner and König, 2005] 
A secret key generated by QKD is used in any cryptographic application, and if 
we are asked the security of such applications then we have to consider Eve 
attacking not only the QKD protocol but also its applications. In this scenario, 
the security analysis would be very difficult as there are many factors. However, 
it has been shown that if a QKD protocol meets a security condition, which we 
call the universal composable privacy condition, then the key distilled in the 
QKD protocol can safely be used for any applications without the degradation of 
the security of the key.   
For instance, in QKD protocol, Alice and Bob initially share the secret key for 
the authentication protocol. The universal composable privacy condition 
guarantees that a secret key generated in a round of the QKD protocol can be 
securely reused for the next rounds of the authentication protocol in the QKD 
protocol. 
The usual security criteria, the security proof based on the distillation of a pure 
state and the one on based on the estimation of Holevo information are known to 
satisfy the universal composable privacy condition. 
 
II – 1 – 2 List of Prioritized Schemes and Current Status of Their Security 
 
This subsection is divided mainly into two parts, the first part is devoted to the 
description of QKD protocols and a technique for increasing achievable secure 
communication distances. In the second part, we briefly mention quantum noise 
randomized cipher. In both parts, we review the current status of the security of each 
protocol. 
 
1. QKD protocols and techniques for increasing achievable secure communication 
distances 
 
In this subsection, we provide protocols, schemes, and the current status of the 
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security of QKD protocols. We also present the decoy state method, which is a 
technique for increasing achievable communication distances. The protocol includes 
quantum communication and classical communication, and as is always the case for 
any protocol, all the classical communication has to be authenticated. Otherwise, we 
do not know with whom we perform the QKD protocol. The authentication uses a 
secret key generated by the previous round of QKD, which means that when we run 
the QKD protocol for the first time, Alice and Bob must have an initially shared 
secret key. Thus, the QKD protocol is sometimes called the quantum key growing 
protocol. We remark that the amount of the secret key needed for the authentication 
is very small; i.e., )(LogNO  for the authentication of N bits [Wegman and Carter, 
1981]. 
 
1A. QKD Protocols 
 
(1) BB84 protocol 
 
Currently, the most investigated protocol both from the viewpoints of theory and 
experiment is the BB84 protocol. In what follows, we describe the encoding scheme, 
signal transmission scheme, measurement scheme, and classical communication for 
BB84. 
 
 
BB84-A Encoding scheme 
 
As we have already mentioned, experimentally, two encoding schemes have been 
used so far. The first scheme is polarization encoding and the other is phase encoding 
of attenuated laser light. In either case, four states (|0x>, |1x>, |0y>, and |1y> or 
equivalently |H>, |V>, |R>, and |L>) are encoded in the single-photon part.  
 
 
BB84-B Signal transmission scheme 
 
The signal transmission scheme is chosen depending on which encoding scheme 
is used, otherwise the signal would be subjected to large disturbances. The use of an 
optical fiber is best in terms of the photon transmission rate; however, birefringence 
in an optical fiber significantly disturbs the polarization state. Thus, when we use 
the polarization of a photon (BB84-A1) as the encoding scheme, we usually choose 
open space as the signal transmission scheme, whereas we use an optical fiber when 
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choosing the relative phase encoding scheme (BB84-A2). 
 
BB84-C Measurement and decoding scheme 
 
The measurement scheme is dependent on the encoding scheme. Again, Bob 
measures the photon polarization when we use the encoding scheme BB84-A1, and 
he measures the relative phase when we choose the BB84-A2 encoding scheme. In 
the latter case, usually a Mach–Zehnder interferometer followed by photon detectors 
are used. 
As part of the measurement, Bob has to randomly choose a measurement basis 
from two possibilities, the X basis and Y basis. In the case of BB84-A1, the basis is 
chosen by randomly switching the polarization wave plate, and in the case of 
BB84-A2, the basis is chosen by randomly applying a phase modulation of either 0 or 
2/  to one arm of the Mach–Zehnder interferometer (see also Fig. 1). In either case, 
one of the measurement outcomes from each basis, |0x> or |0y> (|1x> or |1y>), is 
interpreted as the detection of the bit value 0 (1).  
 
Fig. 1 Decoding scheme using a Mach–Zehnder interferometer. PM represents the 
phase modulator. 
 
 
BB84-D Classical communication 
 
The classical communication phase is typically divided into four phases: the 
sifting phase, error/information leakage estimation phase, error reconciliation phase, 
and privacy amplification phase. Since all the information is exchanged over a public 
channel and so Eve has free access to it. We note that the sifting phase and details of 
the leaked information estimation are protocol-dependent, and all other phases are 
the same among QKD protocols. 
 
BB84-D1 Sifting phase 
Alice and Bob exchange the basis they have used for each transmission of the 
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signal, and they keep the events where they have used the same measurement basis 
and Bob‘s detector (detectors) clicks (click). At this point, each of them has the ―sifted 
key.‖ 
 
BB84-D2 Error/information leakage estimation phase 
To estimate the bit error rate and information leakage, Alice and Bob can 
broadcast some portions of the sifted key over the public channel. The exposed sifted 
key is called the test bits, and the test bits give us an idea of the bit error rate, i.e., 
how much the error rate in the untested bits (code bits) is, and how much 
information is leaked to Eve. Alternatively, as for the bit error rate, Alice and Bob 
can perform error correction and learn along the way the actual bit error rate. We 
remark that the estimation of the leaked information is dependent of what kind of 
encoding scheme we use as well as the imperfections of the devices, and we do not 
give a detailed description of the estimation. 
 
BB84-D2a Error reconciliation phase  
Based on the estimation of the bit error rate in BB84-D2, Alice and Bob choose 
and apply an appropriate error correcting/discarding code to make the sifted keys 
identical.  
The error correcting/discarding code is either unidirectional or bidirectional 
[Assche, 2006, and references therein]. In the unidirectional scheme, only one party 
sends information to the other party, while both compare and broadcast information 
in the bidirectional scheme. The information consists of partial information of the 
code bit, which is used to infer the erroneous bits. Using the information, Alice and 
Bob can thus correct/discard erroneous bits; however, we note that additional 
information is leaked to Eve. 
Low-Density Parity-Check code is well-known unidirectional code, and the 
cascade protocol is an example of bidirectional code. After this phase, Alice and Bob 
share the reconciled key, which has significantly small error. Note that the choice of 
error correction method (one-way or two-way, direct or reverse reconciliation) has to 
fit the applied security proof.  
 
BB84-D2b Privacy amplification 
To convert the reconciled key into a secure key, Alice and Bob use a privacy 
amplification protocol. First, using the public channel, they randomly choose a hash 
function out of a set of hash functions. The set is chosen according to the estimation 
of the leaked information in BB84-D2. Both Alice and Bob then apply the chosen 
hash function to the reconciled key so that they share a secret key.  
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BB84-E Status of the security proof of BB84 and technology required for secure 
communication 
 
The use of the encoding scheme and the measurement scheme that we described 
for BB84-A and BB84-C has proven to achieve unconditionally secure 
communication. We note that when using a single-photon source, the achievable 
distance is long but the implementation of the single-photon source is technologically 
difficult. On the other hand, a weak coherent pulse (WCP) source is available using 
current technology; however, the secure communication distance is compromised. We 
note that the use of the decoy state method (which we explain later) increases the 
achievable distance for a WCP, leading to the same key generation scaling as for the 
single photon. 
The detector can be a threshold detector that only discriminates between a 
vacuum state and non-vacuum state. 
 
(2) BBM92 protocol [Bennett et al., 1992b] 
 
BBM92 is similar to BB84. One difference is that two legitimate parties perform 
the Bob‘s measurement in BB84. These measurements are conducted on the 
photonic states stemming from a photon-pair source located between Alice and Bob, 
who can use a threshold detector. Thus, both parties in BBM92 act as Bob does in 
BB84, following the same measurement and decoding scheme, and all classical 
information is the same as that in BB84.  
The photon-pair source is assumed to be under Eve‘s control, and Alice and Bob 
can judge whether they can generate a secret key depending on the bit error rate. In 
practice, a parametric down-conversion source is often used, where the ideal Bell 
state in the form BABA VVHH  ||||  is generated with some probability. Here the 
subscripts A and B represent particles to be distributed to Alice and Bob 
respectively. 
 
BBM92-E Status of the security proof of BBM92 and technology required for secure 
communication 
 
The protocol described above is unconditionally secure, with the security proof 
shown in the same manner as for BB84.  
 
(3) SARG04 protocol 
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The experimental implementation of SARG04 is the same as that of BB84. The 
differences between the two protocols are the definition of the set of the states in the 
encoding scheme and the definition of the set of the measurements in the decoding 
scheme as well as details of the estimation of the leaked information. Thus, only the 
classical communication part is different from what is used in BB84. One of the 
features that differentiate SARG04 from BB84 is that we can generate a key not 
only from the single-photon part, but also from the two-photon part. Thus, SARG04 
is immune to PNS attack (which we discuss in section II-1-3). 
  
SARG04-A Encoding scheme 
 
As is the case for BB84, two encoding schemes (the polarization encoding and 
phase encoding schemes) are used for SARG04. Since there is one-to-one 
correspondence between the two schemes, as an example, we use the polarization 
scheme to explain SARG04 encoding. In the protocol, Alice sends out the following 
four photon polarization states.  
       H| , V| , R| , L|  
We define four sets of the states. H| and R|  form ―basis a‖, R| and V|  form 
―basis b‖, V|  and L|  form ―basis c‖, and L| and H|  form ―basis d‖. The first 
(second) state of each basis encodes the bit value 0 (1). Note that the bit information 
is encoded in two nonorthogonal states. 
 
 
SARG04-B Signal transmission scheme 
 
The signal transmission scheme is the same as that outlined for BB84-B.  
 
SARG04-C Measurement and decoding scheme 
 
The experimental measurement scheme is the same as that outlined for BB84-C, 
and the decoding scheme differs from that of BB84. The information encoded in 
H|  ( R| ) of basis a is decoded when Bob‘s measurement outcome is L (V). The 
measurement outcomes H and R are inconclusive. Note that this measurement is an 
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unambiguous state discrimination measurement, and the decoding procedures using 
other bases are executed in the same manner. 
  
SARG04-D Classical communication 
 
As previously mentioned, the main difference between the classical 
communications of SARG04 and BB84 is the detail of the estimation of the leaked 
information, which we do not give the description of.  
A minor difference is the sifting phase. In this phase, Alice and Bob exchange 
bases chosen from four bases, and they keep the events where they have used the 
same measurement basis and Bob has obtained the conclusive event. 
 
SARG04-E Status of the security proof of SARG04 and technology required for 
secure communication 
 
The use of the encoding and measurement schemes described in SARG04-A and 
SARG04-C has been proven to achieve unconditionally secure communication. 
Moreover, it has been shown that the two-photon emission part can contribute the 
key generation rate. Note that, in the security proof, we assume the detector 
discriminates among a vacuum, single photon, and multi-photons. This is a technical 
requirement in the security proof, which makes actual implementation difficult.  
As is the case in BB84, the SARG04 protocol can accommodate the decoy state 
method to increase the achievable distance of communication. 
A comparison between BB84 and SARG04 in terms of the achievable 
unconditionally secure communication distance shows that BB84 can cover longer 
distances than SARG04 can, even if we take into account the key generation from 
the two-photon emission part in the SARG04 protocol. 
 
(4) B92 protocol 
 
The B92 protocol uses only two nonorthogonal states and is thus the simplest 
QKD protocol. In principle, any two nonorthogonal states can be used; however, to 
achieve a longer distance of secure communication, the use of strong reference light 
is preferable, which we will describe in detail. 
 
B92-A Encoding scheme 
 
The bit value 0 (1) is encoded as two-mode coherent light RS   ||  ( RS   || ), 
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and these pulses are chosen randomly. Here,   and   can be chosen to be real 
satisfying   <<  . The signal mode and reference mode are spatially separated, 
and usually a Mach–Zehnder interferometer together with a phase modulator is 
used to prepare the pulses. 
 
B92-B Signal transmission scheme 
 
An optical fiber is usually used to efficiently transfer the coherent light. 
 
B92-C Measurement and decoding schemes 
 
Currently, there are two measurement and decoding schemes. 
 
B92-C1 First measurement and decoding scheme 
 
In the first scheme, a Mach–Zehnder interferometer with asymmetric beam 
splitters is used for the decoding. We use three detectors, two of which are for the 
decoding and the other for monitoring the reference pulse.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Schematic diagram of Bob‘s measurement setup for B92. The red bar 
represents an asymmetric beam splitter. 
 
Figure 2 is a schematic illustration of Bob‘s measurement setup where 0 and 1 
represent the decoding detectors and M the monitoring detector. The beam splitter 
in front of the monitoring detector is an asymmetric detector, and its transmission 
rate is tuned in such a way that the mean photon number of the reflected light is the 
same as that of the incoming signal light in normal operation. The monitoring 
detector is important for long-distance secure communication since it serves as a 
countermeasure against unambiguous state discrimination (USD) attack (which we 
will discuss in section II-1-3). Bob records the bit value 0 (1) when only the detector 0 
(1) clicks and the monitoring detector M detects a photon number in a prefixed 
photon number regime. He takes note of the ratio of these events as well as other 
M
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events for the estimation of the leaked information. 
 
B92-C2 Second measurement and decoding scheme 
 
In the second scheme, we assume that Bob has his own local oscillator (strong 
reference light) and a threshold detector for the bit value reading (see also Fig. 3). 
First, he measures the relative phase between the incoming strong reference light 
and his own light, and depending on the measurement outcome, he applies phase 
modulation to his own reference light. The phase-modulated reference light 
interferes with the incoming signal light in bit-value decoding. In addition to this 
feed-forward control, Bob chooses randomly either 0 or   as his phase shift, and he 
applies the phase shift to the signal pulse. This phase shift represents his bit value, 
and if the threshold detector clicks when he sets the phase shift as 0 ( ), then he 
regards the outcome as 0 (1). No click is regarded as an inconclusive event. He takes 
note both of the conclusive event and the ratio of inconclusive events.  
   
Fig. 3. Measurement setup for the second decoding scheme for B92. PM is the phase 
modulator for the feed-forward control, and the detector is a threshold detector. LO 
represents Bob‘s local oscillator (reference light). 
 
B92-D Classical communication 
 
The main differences in the classical communication of B92 compared with that 
of BB84 are the sifting phase and the classical information that is exchanged for the 
estimation of the leaked information. As is also the case for SARG04, the detail of 
the estimation of the leaked information differs, which we do not give the description 
of . All the other classical communication phases run in the same manner as those in 
BB84 does. Thus, we only mention the sifting phase. 
 
B92-D1 Sifting phase 
Bob tells Alice over the public channel which pulse he got conclusive events from. 
Alice keeps all data for which Bob obtained a conclusive event, and she discards all 
other data. 
R
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B92-E Status of the security proof of B92 and technology required for secure 
communication 
 
The use of an encoding scheme and the first measurement scheme that we 
described has proven to achieve unconditionally secure communication. In addition, 
the use of the second measurement scheme was shown to be unconditionally secure 
assuming a large limit for the amplitude of the reference light. We note that in the 
first measurement setup, the detector for the decoding has to discriminate among a 
vacuum, single photon, and multi-photon, and the monitoring detector can 
determine whether the detected photon number is inside a particular photon 
number regime or not. These are technical requirements of the security proof, which 
makes the actual implementation of the first measurement scheme difficult. On the 
other hand, as we have mentioned, we can use a threshold detector for the first 
measurement scheme at the cost of feed-forward control. 
A theoretical comparison between BB84 with decoy states and B92 in terms of the 
achievable unconditionally secure communication distance shows that B92 covers 
longer distances, which are comparable to those of BB84 with decoy states. 
 
(5) DPS-QKD 
 
In DPS-QKD, Alice emits trains of pulses, and bit information is encoded into the 
relative phase between any two consecutive pulses. Thus, a pulse can be both a 
signal pulse and a reference pulse of the following pulse. Intuitively, this protocol is 
considered to be strong against the PNS attack presented in section II-1-3 since the 
time slot in which Bob detects a signal is not under the control of either Bob or Eve. 
 
DPS-A Encoding scheme 
 
Alice emits trains of coherent pulses in such a way that bit information is 
encoded into the relative phase between two consecutive pulses. A relative phase of 0 
( ) represents a bit value of 0 (1). For instance, the bit string 010 is encoded into a 
train of four pulses as 4321 ||||   or 4321 ||||   . The mode 
subscripts represent the time slot of each pulse. 
 
DPS -B Signal transmission scheme 
 
An optical fiber is used to efficiently transfer the coherent light. 
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DPS -C Measurement and decoding scheme 
 
A Mach–Zehnder interferometer with a delay of one time slot is used to read out 
the relative phase. We use two detectors that correspond to bit values of 0 and 1. 
    
 
Fig. 4 Schematic diagram of Bob‘s measurement setup of DPS. The path difference in 
the Mach–Zehnder interferometer is the same as the distance between two 
consecutive pulses. 
 
Figure 4 schematically illustrates Bob‘s measurement setup where 0 and 1 
represent the decoding detectors, the clicking of which tell Bob the detected bit value. 
Bob records which detector clicks as well as the time slot in which the click occurs. 
Simultaneous clicking of the two detectors and neither detector clicking are regarded 
as inconclusive events. He also takes note of the ratio of these events. 
 
DPS-D Classical communication 
 
The main differences between the classical communication of DPS and that of 
BB84 are the sifting phase and the classical information for estimation of the leaked 
information. The detail of the estimation of the leaked information also differs and 
we do not describe it here. All other classical communication phases run in the same 
manner as for those in BB84. Thus, we only mention the sifting phase in what 
follows. 
 
DPS-D1 Sifting phase 
Bob tells Alice over the public channel in which time slot he received the 
conclusive events. Alice keeps all data corresponding to Bob‘s conclusive events and 
discards all other data. 
 
DPS-E Status of the security proof of DPS and technology required for secure 
communication 
 
0
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The unconditional security of DPS has not yet been proven. Instead, security 
against a general individual attack on a photon in a train of signals has been shown 
[Waks et al., 2006]. On the other hand, the unconditional security of a DPS scheme 
with a single-photon source has been proven [Wen et al., 2006]. In this case, the 
detector has to be one that can discriminate among a vacuum, single photon, and 
multi-photons. 
A sequential attack is known to be effective against a DPS scheme. In such an 
attack, Eve uses the USD measurement for each pulse, and when she has 
consecutive successful USD measurement outcomes, she resends signals to Bob 
[Curty et al., 2007; Tsurumaru, 2007]. These signals are not necessarily coherent 
light pulses and they can be a superposition state of a single photon. Analysis shows 
that this attack is effective in the long distance regime.  
 
(6) CV-QKD 
 
The main difference between the CV-QKD protocol and the above QKD protocols 
is the use of homodyne-based measurements instead of photon-counting-based 
measurements for CV-QKD, where the former measures the quadrature amplitude 
of the signal, which is a continuous variable. Several CV-QKD protocols have been 
proposed so far on the basis of squeezed states or coherent states as the signals. In 
what follows, details of CV-QKD protocols based on a coherent state are described. 
 
CV-A Encoding scheme 
 
Random values are encoded in the complex amplitude of the coherent state signal. 
There are two encoding schemes depending on the modulation format.  
 
CV-A1 Gaussian modulation  
Signals are continuously encoded in a complex amplitude  (i.e., two-dimensional 
phase space) of the coherent state  . When Bob‘s measurement is a homodyne 
measurement, Alice encodes a single-bit value, while she can encode a two-bit value 
if Bob performs a heterodyne measurement. The latter encoding scheme is referred 
to as a doubly encoded scheme. 
 
CV-A2 Discrete modulation 
The signal is phase modulated by a fixed amount depending on the randomly 
chosen basis and bit value. For instance, a q-squeezed state is displaced in q by +c 
(−c) when Alice‘s bit value is 0 (1), where c is a positive constant. The encoding with 
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respect to p goes in the same manner. 
 
CV-B Signal transmission scheme 
 
Coherent states are efficiently transferred via an optical fiber or free-space 
propagation. 
 
CV-C Measurement and decoding scheme 
 
In the following, we describe the measurement scheme. The decoding scheme is 
dependent on whether the protocol is discrete-modulated or Gaussian-modulated. 
Bob tries to readout the discrete variable encoded by Alice in the case of 
discrete-modulated while he uses a prefixed decoding scheme in the case of Gaussian 
modulation. An example of the prefixed decoding scheme is as follows. Imagine that 
Bob measures the x component of the complex amplitude, which is a continuous 
variable. In this case, Bob interprets the measurement outcome x as the bit value 0 
(1) if n is even (odd) where (2n – 1)c < x  (2n + 1)c and n = …–3, –2, –1, 0, 1, 2, 3,… 
Decoding for the doubly encoding scheme is in the same manner with respect to both 
x and p. 
 
CV-C1 Homodyne detection  
In this measurement setup, either the x or p component of the complex amplitude 
is randomly read out. This random choice of the basis corresponds to the random 
basis choice in BB84.  
 
CV-C2 Heterodyne detection 
By splitting the incoming light, both the x and p components of the complex 
amplitude are randomly read out. Note that this does not mean both x and p 
components can be measured simultaneously. The splitting, of course, enlarges the 
variance of the statistic of the measurement outcomes.  
 
CV-D Classical communication 
 
CV-D1 Sifting phase 
If the protocol involves a random choice of the basis, then the sifting process must 
be performed in the same manner as for the sifting phase in BB84. However, if the 
protocol is a doubly encoding scheme, then we do not need to perform the sifting. 
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CV-D2 Noise/information leakage estimation phase 
 To estimate channel noise and information leakage, Alice and Bob sacrifice 
portions of the sifted key as test bits, and Bob broadcasts all the relevant statistics 
he took note of in the measurement stage. We do not give the detailed description of 
the estimation of the leakage information.  
 
CV-D2a Error reconciliation phase 
In the one-way error correction, the syndrome goes from Alice to Bob (direct 
reconciliation) or from Bob to Alice (reverse reconciliation). 
  
CV-E Status of the security proof of CV-QKD and technology required for secure 
communication 
 
There are many versions of CV protocols, and some of them are unconditionally 
secure.  
 
1B Technique for increasing the achievable distance of secure communication (decoy 
state method) 
  
In this subsection, we describe the decoy state method, which increases the 
achievable distance of secure communication. This method is used for 
single-photon-based QKD, such as BB84, SARG04, six-state protocol (the six-state 
version of BB84), and the single-photon-based B92 with imperfect source 
implementation to combat the PNS attack that will be discussed in section II-1-3. 
This method increases secure communication distances when the light source is one 
that sometimes emits multi-photon, leading to the same scaling of the key 
generation rate as for the perfect single-photon source. 
In this method, the encoding scheme, signal transmission scheme, measurement 
scheme, and decoding scheme are the same as the original protocols; i.e., BB84 or 
SARG04. However, there are some differences. The first difference is that Alice 
randomly chooses and emits decoy pulses that have mean photon number that is 
different from the one of the signal pulse. Typically, the number of choices for the 
decoy pulses is two, three, or four including the vacuum state. The basic idea behind 
this method is that Eve cannot discriminate whether the received pulse is a decoy 
pulse or not. Thus, she cannot behave differently for a signal pulse and decoy pulse, 
and what Eve does to the decoy pulses gives us a clue about what she has done to the 
single-photon part of the signal pulses. More precisely, Alice and Bob expose all the 
data stemmed from the decoy pulses to estimate the bit error rate and the ratio of 
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the detection events for each decoy pulse. This data processing for the estimation 
serves as the second difference, and this estimation gives us an idea of the bit error 
rate and the ratio of the detection events for the single-photon part of the signal 
pulse, which is taken into account in the privacy amplification.  
 
2. QNRC 
 
Besides QKD schemes, the QNRC protocol also uses quantum properties to make 
communication substantially secure. We define the class of the protocol as one-way 
secret communication protocols with physical encoding schemes that directly encode 
messages into a particular quantum state depending on the message, secret key 
information, and other physical inner states of the encoder. The use of quantum 
noise would reinforce secrecy in communication and increase the efficiency in the 
use of the communication bandwidth, although cryptographic understanding of the 
reinforced secrecy is an issue to be carefully investigated. Here we describe schemes 
and the current status of the security of a QNRC based on the Y00 (or ) protocol, 
which is a protocol known to realize the above concept.  
 
Y00-A Key expansion scheme 
 
Alice and Bob share a secret key (referred to as the seed key). The seed key is 
expanded by a key expansion function (e.g., a linear feedback shift register or AES in 
stream cipher mode) to generate a running key sequence (Z1, Z2 …) such that each Zi 
takes M values. 
 
Y00-B Encryption scheme 
 
Length n plaintext (X1, X2 …) is encoded in the coherent state: 
 ),(exp),( iiii ZXiZX    
  ))((/),( iiiii ZPolXMZZX   
where )( iZPol 0 or 1 according to whether iZ  is even or odd. Note that one can 
also encrypt text in coherent states with different physical formats such as DPS 
keying or intensity modulation.  
 
Y00-C Signal transmission scheme 
 
Coherent states are efficiently transferred via an optical fiber or free-space 
propagation. 
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Y00-D Decryption scheme 
 
Bob generates a running key sequence (Z1, Z2 …) from the seed key and the same 
key expansion function as Alice uses. Then for each quantum signal ),( ii ZX , Bob 
makes a homodyne measurement to discriminate ),0( iZ  and ),1( iZ  and 
decrypt Xi. 
 
Y00-E Status of the security of Y00 
 
In practice, the security of Y00 and related protocols is based on computational 
complexity. As mentioned in section I-2-1, quantitative security analyses of the 
protocols have not yet produced clear results. The protocols are at least as secure as 
conventional (nonrandom) ciphers, but how much the additional randomness due to 
quantum noise increases the complexity is still unknown. It is highly desirable to 
conduct contemporary cipher analyses. 
 
II – 1 – 3 Limited Attacks 
 
It is important to consider the unconditional security, however, because of the 
technological limitation, we cannot actually implement any attack. Therefore, for the 
practical purpose, it is important to consider the security against some limited 
attacks in order to see the secure communication distances that a protocol can 
achieve from the practical viewpoint. The analysis of a particular attack sometimes 
reveals the essential fragility of a protocol, and this fragility serves as a hint to 
modify the protocol or to consider the countermeasure against the attack. Thus, such 
analysis not only gives us the limitation of a protocol, but it is also helpful to improve 
the protocol. In this subsection, we list up several limited attacks against QKD and 
QNRC. 
 
1. QKD 
 
Here we introduce classes of attacks against QKD, followed by limited attacks. 
 
Classes of attacks 
 
 Collective Attacks [Biham and Mor, 1997] 
In collective attacks, Eve first prepares ancilla systems, each of which is to 
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interact with each signal sent by Alice. After the interactions and listening to 
classical information over the public channel, Eve performs an optimal joint 
measurement on all ancilla systems to retrieve information on the key. This 
attack class has been introduced since it eases theoretic analysis. We now know 
that security against this type of attack also implies security against most 
general coherent attacks [Renner and Cirac, 2008]. 
 
 Individual Attacks [Lütkenhaus, 2000] 
In individual attacks, Eve first prepares ancilla systems, each of which is to 
interact with each signal sent by Alice. After the interactions and listening to 
classical information over the public channel, Eve performs an optimal 
individual measurement on each ancilla system. Thus, the difference between 
the collective attacks and the individual attacks is whether Eve‘s final 
measurement is a collective measurement or not. The operational definition 
would be that Eve does not require interacting quantum memories for this 
attack, though a variation of individual attacks without a delay of the 
measurement might be by now a more reasonable choice.  
 
Limited attacks 
 
  Photon Number Splitting (PNS) Attack [Bennett et al., 1992; Huttner et al., 
1995] 
The PNS attack was invented to eavesdrop on the BB84 protocol or six-state 
protocol. Original proposals of these protocols assumed the use of a 
single-photon source; however, since the implementation of the single-photon 
source is difficult, the attenuated laser light source is replaced with it. The 
crucial difference between a single-photon source and laser light source is that 
multi-photon is emitted by the laser light source. From the multi-photon 
emission part, Eve can obtain information without causing disturbance using 
the following attack, which we refer to as the PNS attack. 
First, Eve performs a quantum nondemolition measurement of the photon 
number, and if the number is greater than one, say n (>1), then she keeps n – 1 
photons while letting the single photon go to Bob‘s side. After listening to the 
basis information exchanged over the public channel, Eve conducts the 
measurement with the basis so that she can obtain bit information without 
causing errors.  
In the security analysis, we make the worst case assumption that Eve sends as 
many signals as possible to Bob from Alice‘s multi-photon emission part, while 
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she suppresses the sending of signals from Alice‘s single-photon emission part as 
much as possible. With this assumption, the resulting secure communication 
distance turns out to be very short. Thus, the use of an attenuated laser light 
source limits the secure communication distance.  
This attack is an important example of the vulnerability of imperfect devices. 
We note that this attack is applicable for any photon source that emits multi- 
photon. Finally, we note that the decoy state method is a good countermeasure of 
this attack, and it allows us to increase the secure communication distance as we 
do not need to work on the worst case assumption in the security analysis. 
 
 Unambiguous State Discrimination (USD) Attack [Dûsek et al., 2000] 
A natural way to obtain information from the incoming signals sent by Alice is 
to try to identify the state. It is known that if the states are linearly independent 
of one another, then state identification is possible with some probability. This 
type of measurement is called USD, which is one of the most important tools for 
eavesdropping. In principle, Eve can utilize this measurement for 
eavesdropping on the B92, DPS-QKD, and BB84 protocols without phase 
randomization where linearly independent states are used. It is known that a 
USD attack significantly limits the secure communication distance of BB84 
without phase randomization compared with BB84 with phase randomization; 
however, the limitation that USD poses on DPS-QKD is not so significant. 
Regarding B92, if this protocol is implemented with a strong reference light, 
then USD attack is not effective because the failure identification in USD 
results in bit errors. Typically, USD attacks show the limit of the performance of 
schemes in the absence of errors.  
 
 Intercept and Resend Attack 
Among attacks described in this subsection, the intercept and resend attack is 
the most practical. In this attack, Eve makes a measurement, and depending on 
the measurement outcome, she resends states to Bob. The measurement might 
be the same as the one Bob performs and the states to be resent are those Alice 
prepares. In this case, Eve impersonates both Alice and Bob, which is obviously 
feasible with current technologies. Since Eve‘s operation is equivalent to the 
so-called entanglement breaking channel, this attack does not allow the 
distribution of quantum correlations needed to establish a secret key [Curty et 
al., 2004]. Thus, QKD protocol that can be broken by an intercept and resend 
attack cannot be considered secure no matter what modification Alice and Bob 
make in the classical communication part. 
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2. QNRC 
 
As already mentioned in previous sections, the QNRC is expected to provide 
higher computational complex-theoretic security than contemporary symmetric 
ciphers do. Therefore, the security notions listed here follow those commonly used 
for contemporary symmetric ciphers. Typical security analyses of symmetric ciphers 
are classified into two categories depending on the scenario [Katz and Lindell, 2007]. 
  
 Ciphertext only attack 
For the attacker, whose goal is to obtain information of both the message and 
secret key, only ciphertext is available in the first scenario. In the case of 
quantum data encoding schemes where the definition of ciphertext might be 
ambiguous, we suppose that the quantum state of the physical carrier is 
available to the attacker. When the encoded message is random, the information 
of the secret key must not be leaked in an informational sense whatever the 
security of the scheme. 
 
 Known plaintext attack 
We suppose the information of the message as well as the corresponding 
ciphertext is available to the attacker. The goal of the attacker is to obtain 
information of the secret key. 
 
II – 1 – 4 Security Threats and Imperfections of Devices 
 
In this subsection, we briefly discuss security threats/imperfections of devices 
and problems that need to be resolved for the realization of secure and fast 
communications. In a security proof, we usually assume that Bob‘s two detectors for 
the bit value reading have the same quantum efficiencies. However, this is difficult 
to accomplish, and normally two detectors have different quantum efficiencies, 
which Eve may exploit for eavesdropping. Another example of a problem arising 
from a device imperfection is a side channel. Imagine that Alice performs phase 
modulations on the signal pulses depending on the chosen bit value. In this case, if 
the phase modulation emits some electromagnetic wave dependent on the bit value, 
then Eve can simply measure the electromagnetic wave to obtain bit information 
and she does not need to attack the QKD itself. The side-channel effects exist 
regardless of quantum and classical cryptography, and thus they are very difficult to 
eliminate. In the following, we list possible threats and problems that need to be 
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taken into account for secure and fast communications. 
 
 
State Preparation 
 Source evaluations: Most security proofs assume the characterization of the 
source. Thus, we need to consider how to experimentally check or characterize 
the state of outgoing signal pulses.  
 Random number generator (RNG): A fast and true random number generator is 
necessary for the state preparation in most of QKD protocols. Such a generator 
is very difficult to realize. 
 Strong pulse attack: Eve might shed strong light onto Alice‘s side to peep at 
which phase modulation Alice applies. By measuring the reflected light, Eve can 
infer the encoded information. We need to consider a theoretical/experimental 
countermeasure against this attack. 
 Side-channel vulnerability: There might be a case in which unwanted signals 
containing useful information, such as bit information and basis information, 
are emitted from the sender‘s devices. Theoretical and experimental 
countermeasures against this attack need to be considered. 
 
Measurement 
 Measurement unit characterization: Most security proofs assume a 
mathematical description of the measurement. However, given the experimental 
devices, it is very difficult to write a precise mathematical representation.  
 Imperfections of devices: In most cases, assumptions in theory are not satisfied 
in experiments. One example is a detector efficiency mismatch. Such 
imperfections must be taken into account theoretically and/or removed 
experimentally. 
 Side-channel vulnerability: This is the same as side-channel vulnerability in the 
state preparation.  
 RNG: This is the same as the issue for the RNG in the state preparation.  
 
Classical Communication 
 Finite size effect: Most theory of security analyses assumes that the number of 
pulses Alice emits is infinite, which makes the analysis simpler as we do not 
need to consider variances of data. In practice however, the number of pluses is 
finite, and the finite size effect has to be treated seriously. 
 Error correction: A classical error correcting code that is efficient in terms of the 
decoding speed and the capability of correcting as many errors as possible is 
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needed for fast communication or long-distance communication. 
 Privacy amplification: This is related to the RNG problem. In privacy 
amplification for fast communication, we need to generate a random number 
and make the calculations very fast. 
 
II – 1 – 5 Performance Specification Table 
Following the discussion from section II-1-1 to II-1-4, the assumptions and 
performances of QKD protocols may be summarized in the following table.  
 
 
 
II – 2 Interoperability Specifications and Requirements 
 
II – 2 – 1 Interoperability with a Contemporary Cryptographic System 
 
There are two possible problems with the interoperability of QKD and a 
contemporary cryptographic system, and they may be topics in future UQC meetings. 
The first problem concerns the loss of unconditional security that occurs when one 
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combines QKD with modern cryptographic algorithms, such as an AES, for 
encrypting messages. This setup is commonly used in most of today‘s QKD products 
or in experimental demonstrations (e.g., for updating an AES key every 5 minutes) 
mainly because key generations of a QKD are not yet fast enough in some 
applications to catch up with communication using OTPs. Although unconditional 
security is no longer guaranteed in these cases, it may still be possible that 
refreshing secret keys at short intervals can enhance the security of conventional 
cryptographic systems. However, secret keys are not updated in almost all secret 
communication using conventional cryptographic systems. As far as we know, there 
are no theories that justify such intuition, which might be done by introducing new 
security criteria. 
The second problem is the combination of QKD and information-theoretic secure 
cryptographic protocols. In the field of modern cryptography, once a large number of 
secret keys are available, there are many protocols that realize cryptographic 
functions other than secret communications while achieving information-theoretic 
security. There are important problems in the application of a protocol that provides 
mutual authentication or a digital signature within a conventional cryptographic 
system from the viewpoint of an application program interface (API) and the data 
format. In addition, the concept and security evaluation methods in conventional 
cryptographic protocols differ from those for QKD and information-theoretic secure 
cryptographic protocols. We need to determine the achieved security function of such 
combination systems and security requirements. 
 
II – 2 – 2 Interoperability among Quantum Cryptosystems 
 
1. QKD networks: general considerations 
Different schemes of quantum cryptography need to be integrated so as to 
provide a wide range of solutions for highly secure networks, rather than users being 
restricted to an OTP by QKD. For example, a secure symmetric key generated by 
QKD can be used as the seed key for quantum noise-randomized encryption to 
provide reasonable solutions based on quantum technology for high data rate secure 
communications. Architectures of such quantum secure networks will be a central 
issue in the next phase of research on quantum cryptography. In this subsection, we 
focus on the first necessary step to realize QKD networks having as long a range as 
possible.  
QKD links can only operate over point-to-point connections between two users, 
and cannot be deployed over any arbitrary network topology. To overcome this 
limitation, it is important to realize networking QKD links or QKD networks 
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between multiple users. Interoperability among different quantum cryptosystems is 
particularly indispensable for the effective integration of QKD into secure networks.  
For sound cryptographic and security analysis as well to focus on the essential 
goals of a QKD network, it is important to determine the main properties and 
objectives of such a network. In general, there are different ways to define a QKD 
network. One QKD network concept is of an infrastructure for information-theoretic 
secure key agreement, which relies on quantum resources available to the legitimate 
participants, while not imposing bounds on the eavesdropping capabilities of the 
adversary, and allows the connectivity of parties that do not share a direct, fixed 
quantum channel. This definition naturally extends the properties of a 
point-to-point (link) QKD. A QKD network specified as above could in principle allow 
(depending on the realization) the lifting of the typical restrictions for stand-alone 
QKD links and establish key sharing over long distances (e.g., on a continental scale) 
by increasing and maximizing the throughput capacity (the key generation rate), 
ensuring robustness against denial of service attacks and technical service 
breakdowns. 
Two techniques, quantum channel switching and trusted repetition, are available 
for constructing a QKD network. An end-to-end quantum channel over many nodes 
can in principle be created using quantum repeaters that have not yet been 
technically realized. Current technology allows for optical switching and/or trusted 
repeater networks. 
 
(a) Quantum channel switching  
Quantum channel switching can create an end-to-end quantum channel (or more 
generally distributed quantum resources) between Alice and Bob. In optically 
switched quantum networks, some classical optical functions such as beam splitting, 
switching, multiplexing, and demultiplexing can be applied to the quantum signals 
to create a direct quantum channel physically (i.e., on demand). The interest in such 
optical networking capabilities in the context of QKD networks is that they allow us 
to go beyond two-user QKD. Active optical switching can be used to allow the 
selective connection of any two parties with a direct quantum channel. Optical 
functions can thus be used to realize multiple-user QKD, and the intermediate sites 
do not need to be trusted since quantum signals are transmitted over a quantum 
channel with no interruption from one end-user QKD device to another. In this sense, 
the security analysis coincides with that for a stand-alone QKD link.  
This QKD network model cannot, however, be used to extend the distance over 
which keys can be distributed. Indeed, the extra optical losses introduced in the 
switching devices will in reality decrease the transmission capacity of quantum 
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channels and thus the maximal key distribution distance. In addition, in a fully 
switched optical network, any two parties need to share an initial secret so as to be 
able to start the key agreement process. Overall, these types of networks are not 
scalable and thus not suitable for a long distance QKD network.  
From the point of view of interoperability, such networks require QKD devices of 
exactly the same type, and in fact, from the same vendor. For example, one ―Alice‖ 
device can be connected over a passive switch (a beam splitter) to two ―Bob‖ devices 
of the same type. The set of quantum signals would be split into two subsets, Bob1 
and Bob2, allowing Alice, after sifting, to establish two independent keys with the 
two Bobs. Active switching would in turn allow a direct communication (like a 
classical telephone line) between an ―Alice‖ device and a ―Bob‖ device. In summary, 
such solutions would allow any-to-any communication on a metropolitan scale. 
 
(b) Trusted repeater  
A trusted repeater transports keys over many intermediate nodes, which are 
trustworthy (i.e., not infiltrated by an eavesdropper). Trusted repeater QKD 
networks have been discussed in various contexts since the advent of quantum 
cryptography. Essentially, these networks are infrastructures composed of QKD 
links (pairs of QKD devices associated by a quantum and a classical communication 
channel), each link connecting two separate locations (nodes). A QKD trusted 
repeater network is then a connected graph, the vertices of which are nodes, and the 
edges QKD links. Several QKD devices—the end points of links pointing to different 
nodes—are then accumulated in a single node. Using the links connected to a node, 
it is possible to retransmit (repeat) secret information along the network. The goal is 
network-wide key distribution whereby the distributed key does not necessarily 
have a QKD origin. To avoid confusion, this key is referred to as ―secret‖ in what 
follows. A particular mechanism (sometimes called a hop-by-hop mechanism) works 
as follows. 
 The nodes are equipped with classical memories for accumulating the key 
material generated over the connected QKD links.  
 Secret distribution is performed over a QKD path (i.e., a one-dimensional chain 
of QKD links and corresponding nodes), establishing a connection between a 
sender node and recipient node.  
 Secrets (e.g., those generated by a true RNG) are forwarded using 
unconditionally secure transport along the path. At each node, the outgoing 
secret is encrypted by an OTP using key material which was previously 
generated over the outgoing QKD link from the chain and stored in the memory 
of the node. 
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 The resulting cipher message is classically dispatched together with an 
authentication tag to the next node on the path; i.e., to the one connected to the 
other end of the very same link. After the received authentication tag is verified, 
the transported secret is then decrypted using the same key material as that 
used for encryption. This material is stored in the memory of the node and 
naturally originates from the incoming QKD link. The process is repeated until 
the transported secret reaches its destination. 
End-to-end information-theoretic security is obtained between the sender and 
recipient nodes provided that all intermediate nodes can be trusted, as the nodes 
possess the full communicated information. The trusted nodes thus play the role of 
(classical) trusted repeaters.  
Generally speaking, trusted repeater QKD networks allow the covering of 
arbitrary distances, connection of an arbitrary number of participants, and use of 
pairs of QKD devices of different types and from different vendors.  
The first proof-of-principle QKD network demonstrator, the DARPA Quantum 
Network, was deployed between Harvard University, Boston University, and BBN 
Technologies in 2004 [Elliott, 2002; Elliott et al., 2005] involving both switching and 
trusted repeater techniques (see below). A highly integrated trusted repeater 
network demonstrator, developed within the framework of the Integrated European 
Project SECOQC (financed by the European Commission within the framework of 
FP6 between 2004 and 2008) was deployed, tested, and demonstrated in Vienna 
[Poppe et al., 2008]. 
 
2. Example of QKD networks: SECOQC trusted network demonstrator 
The SECOQC trusted repeater network demonstrator (Vienna, October 2008) 
consists of eight different QKD links of six different types: three Plug-and-Play 
systems from idQuantique, a Coherent One-Way system from GAP Optique with the 
participation of idQuantique and the Austrian Research Centers, a CV system from 
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and THALES Research and 
Technology with the participation of Universite Libre des Brussels, a One-Way Weak 
Pulse System from Toshiba Research of the United Kingdom, and an Entangled 
Photons System from the University of Vienna and the Austrian Research Centers. 
Additionally, two nodes situated in adjacent buildings were connected by a 
free-space link from Ludwig Maximillians University in Munich (line of sight of 81 
m). The QKD links were integrated into a network consisting of six nodes. The 
average distance between the nodes is between 20 and 30 kilometers, with the 
longest link being 83 kilometers. 
SECOQC has introduced the additional constraint that initial secret keys 
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(needed for authentication) are only shared between neighboring nodes (i.e., nodes 
directly connected by a QKD link) and not between any arbitrary pair. This 
constraint ensures that the number of initial secrets to be shared scales (for 
wide-area networks) with the number of network nodes and not with their square. 
This in turn largely simplifies the initialization of a QKD network and the adoption 
of additional nodes during operation. 
An essential feature of the prototype is its network architecture. The corner stone 
of this architecture is the design of the node. As outlined above, the node essentially 
contains entities that manage the keys generated over QKD links and ensures 
cryptographic services (encryption and authentication) for the transport of secret 
information. At the same time, each QKD device is equipped with a mechanism for 
device-to-device classical communication, key management (initial and subsequent 
authentication keys), and cryptographic services (authentication) so as to have the 
capacity of distilling a key. To overcome this redundancy, SECOQC has put forward 
the following approach. QKD devices are stripped of stand-alone functionality. They 
have access to the quantum channel alone and classical communication with a 
dedicated node device, called a node module (designed and implemented by the 
Austrian Research Centers). The node module manages all key material of the 
underlying QKD device and provides an authenticated classical channel for the 
device. In this sense, the only objective of the QKD device is to communicate over the 
quantum channel and distill and push a key to the node, using the communication 
facilities of the latter. The node in turn manages the point-to-point connections 
(including classical communication with neighbors, key management, and 
cryptographic services) to be in a position to find paths to the required destinations 
and realize secure transport protocols as outlined above.  
Three types of services can be grouped in network layers: a quantum 
point-to-point (Q3P) layer, a quantum network layer, and a quantum transport layer 
[Dianati et al., 2008]. The Q3P layer encapsulates the specifics of QKD. For this 
layer, QKD devices are the key providers. The upper layers use the Q3P layer alone 
and have no information on the underlying technology. This design allows a 
seamless integration of arbitrary QKD devices into QKD trusted repeater networks. 
Technically, SECOQC has put forward a standardized Q3P specification and defined 
interfaces for device-to-node-module interoperation. As already mentioned, the cost 
is the loss of stand-alone functionality of the SECOQC QKD devices. However, such 
functionality is easily regained by adding two node modules (running only Q3P 
layers) to such devices or by simply integrating Q3P software into each device.  
The quantum network and quantum transport layers are generally similar to 
those of existing classical network protocols. However, two issues are of special 
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importance. To ensure network-wide information-theoretic security, key material 
transport has to be information-theoretic secure. Simultaneous path finding and 
transport protocols require considerable auxiliary network traffic (signaling). It 
would be a significant waste of key material to use information-theoretic secure 
transport for this entire load. A nontrivial cryptographic task is to determine optimal 
approaches and potential attacks on this level. In SECOQC, the respective protocols 
use authentic transmission of the signaling information and information-theoretic 
secure transmission for the payload.  
It should be emphasized that all three network layers have been designed so that 
the only target of communication is end-to-end key distribution. Secure 
communication of the end-user information is handed over to a classic (or generally, 
any type of) secure communication infrastructure. The latter could use at will the 
key distributed between the secure locations of the QKD network. 
This approach effectively defines three separate network planes: a quantum 
plane (quantum channels and QKD devices that push the key to the node modules), 
a secret information plane (node modules with classical communication channels 
between them with Q3P, network, and transport logical layers that use the 
QKD-generated key to distribute an information-theoretic secure key between any 
two nodes on the network), and a data plane (in which the distributed key is used by 
a secure communication infrastructure to ensure end-to-end network secure 
communication). 
While the SECOQC approach allows complete interoperability in the trusted 
repeater regime, a development of adequate QKD network architecture in the mixed 
regime (e.g., trusted repeater backbones combined with local area switched 
networks) remains an open issue requiring further dedicated research. 
 
II – 3 Derived Test Requirements 
 
We here consider testing and measurement (T&M) procedures for a QKD system. 
There are three aspects to T&M: ensuring security by confirming the assumptions 
behind the security proof, increasing the final key rate by restricting the 
eavesdropper‘s knowledge, and achieving stable operation. The first and second 
aspects are closely related; security proofs with a small number of assumptions may 
overestimate the leakage of information to Eve and yield only a low final key rate. 
We treat the first two aspects together, and discuss separately the third aspect on 
calibration and synchronization. Subtle issues arise because T&M procedures should 
never give clues to the eavesdropper. To reduce the burden of a secure T&M 
procedure, it is necessary to select a protocol, design robust implementation, and 
UQC Report version 1 
 
 
 
55 
develop stable devices. 
 
 
II – 3 – 1 Reference System 
 
The following consideration assumes the use of the decoy-BB84 protocol [Hwang, 
2003; Lo et al., 2005b; Wang, 2005], which has been extensively studied for practical 
QKD systems. Knowledge gained can be applied to systems based on other protocols. 
A reference system is helpful in considering the effects of imperfections in practical 
QKD systems. We here define a reference system that includes device imperfections 
in a tractable form. The system is depicted in Fig. 1 and consists of a transmitter, 
quantum channel, and receiver.  
In the transmitter, a light source, which we assume to be a laser, emits light 
pulses with a Poissonian photon number distribution and an average photon number 
2
LL   . There should be no phase relation among the successive pulses (i.e., no 
phase reference). An encoder then creates four photon states for the BB84 protocol 
according to the output of an RNG. In X–Y coding, the photon states after the 
modulator are represented by the points (100), (–100), (010), and (0–10) on the Bloch 
sphere: 
S
L
F
LXY
i 2]exp[2      (II-3.1) 
where the relative phase  between the fast1 component F and the slow component S 
                                                   
 
1 We assume a time-divided double pulse, which is common in fiber-based QKD systems. 
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varies over    and. In X–Y coding, the photon states are represented by 
the points (100), (–100), (001), and (00–1) on the Bloch sphere: 
SSFFXZ
i ]exp[      (II-3.2) 
where ),0(),0,(),( LLSF   for Z states and 2/LSF   ,    for X states. 
The average photon number of the pulses should be randomly selected from   
n by an intensity modulator. Intensity modulators should change the 
attenuation for each pulse so that the bandwidth exceeds the clock frequency.  
In the receiver, a decoder analyzes the input states and the photon is transported 
to one of the photon detectors according to its state. The analyzing basis of the input 
state may be selected by a random number (active choice) or by a beam splitter 
(passive choice). We assume the photon detectors to be threshold devices (not 
photon-number resolving), whose detection events originate from photon detection 
with finite detection efficiency and dark counts.  
 
II – 3 – 2 Test Items for Secure Key Generation 
 
The T&M items are shown in balloons in Fig. 1. Measurement results may 
contain errors, the impact of which on the sacrificed bits can be estimated by 
calculating derivatives of the leakage information and its variance given in a 
reference. Security threats have been discussed in section II-1-4. At the heart of the 
countermeasures is the minimization of information for the basis selection and bit 
value. We here focus on characterization; other important issues such as random 
number generation and side channel vulnerability are briefly discussed in section 
II-1-4. 
 
State Preparation (Transmitter)  
QKD systems send random numbers encoded as nonorthogonal photon states 
from Alice to Bob. The BB84 protocol, for example, employs four states; i.e., two 
orthogonal states in two complementary bases. The photons should be 
indistinguishable for Eve not to be given any information. Therefore, the transmitter 
should emit 
・ correct states and 
・ photon pulses identical to those for states used for encoding in terms of timing, 
shape, spectrum, and other characteristics. 
The former issue is related to calibration and is discussed later. Characterization of 
the output pulses is necessary to ensure the identity. We can set criteria for the 
identity of the pulses. For example, spectral resolution is limited by the pulse 
UQC Report version 1 
 
 
 
57 
duration, and the distinguishability of the two states in the spectrum region can be 
characterized by cross-correlation convoluted with the resolution. Similar criteria 
can be set for the timing and pulse shape. 
It may be difficult to ensure the similarity of the pulses if independent lasers are 
used to represent different quantum states. The difficulty with using lasers comes 
from the fact that they are active nonlinear devices. The rise time and intensity of 
the laser pulses will differ according to the bit sequence because of carrier 
accumulation that is dependent on the bit pattern (the so-called pattern effect). This 
effect becomes significant as the pulse frequency increases. It would be safer to 
design the transmitter using a single laser for the light source. In this design, the 
laser is driven with fixed periodic pulses so that there is no pattern effect. The 
photon states are prepared with a modulator, whose properties should be 
independent of the output states. Since the modulators operate linearly, it is easier 
to satisfy the conditions. 
The decoy method requires precise control of the pulse intensity (average photon 
number). The attenuation of a fast modulator, such as a lithium niobate modulator, 
may drift and one needs to monitor it to adjust the designed values. This can be done 
using a combination of a fast modulator and a fixed stable attenuator. The output of 
the fast modulator is branched and monitored at a test point by a photodetector. The 
power-controlled output of the fast modulator is further attenuated by the fixed 
attenuator to a designed average photon number. In practical systems, the accuracy 
of the power is finite. Furthermore, it is difficult to control the intensity of each pulse. 
We need to be satisfied with measuring a distribution of the pulse intensity. It is 
necessary to develop a theory to estimate the number of sacrificed bits in the 
framework of a finite length code. However, if the distribution is sharp enough, the 
effect of the power accuracy may be negligible. 
The decoy method also assumes a Poisson distribution for the photon number in 
the transmitter. The photon number distribution should be rigorously confirmed. 
However, we may safely assume a Poisson distribution because the system employs 
a laser light source with heavy attenuation.  
 
Measurement (Receiver) 
The receiver should also detect photons with the same detection efficiency for all 
expected photon states, otherwise Eve may make use of the tendency of detecting a 
specific state to obtain information on the states sent. Analysis [Lo et al., 2005a; 
Hayashi, 2009] suggests that the detection efficiencies may depend on the basis, as 
long as the detection efficiencies for 0 and 1 are identical using each basis. It has 
been shown that security can be proved for appropriately characterized detectors 
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with detection efficiencies for 0 and 1 that are mismatched [Fung et al., 2008]. 
Further theoretical study is needed to apply practical situations. 
Note that the afterpulse effect may provide another loophole; the effect causes 
correlation between the photon detection events because it increases the probability 
that the same detector fires with successive gate pulses. It is necessary to measure 
the afterpulse probability as a function of the gate interval, and use a sufficient 
blanking time for the afterpulse effect to be reduced. 
 
II – 3 – 3 Trusted Device 
 
One may improve the final key rate by setting the assumption that Eve can 
access the apparatuses of Alice and Bob only through the transmission channel. The 
assumption eliminates the effects of errors originating from the apparatus, such as 
imperfections in the encoder and decoder and dark counts for the detectors. It is, 
however, necessary to measure such imperfections precisely and to ensure that the 
measured values are free from Eve‘s actions. Since we assume that Eve can fully 
control the quantum channel, a reliable method is to restrict the measurement to a 
local measurement. Bob can measure the dark counts locally simply by closing the 
input of the receiver. On the other hand, Bob (or Alice) needs a calibration standard 
for the decoder/encoder at the local site to measure the residual imperfection. It is 
safer to use only the dark counts as a local error source if it is difficult to prepare 
reliable standards. In this case, we regard errors from the imperfections in the 
encoder and decoder as the result of eavesdropping. 
 
II – 3 – 4 Calibration and Drift 
 
Alice and Bob need to match their bases and amount of modulation before 
quantum communication. If Alice and Bob are together in a laboratory, the 
procedure for this initial calibration is almost trivial (though the calibration itself is 
not a trivial task.) They can calibrate their devices by connecting directly and 
measuring the interference with a strong light. However, if they are apart, the 
calibration is no longer simple because Eve may control the channel. She can 
influence the measurement results and drive the wrongly calibrated devices. If a 
strong light is used for calibration, Eve can obtain full information on the state of the 
light and control the measurement result for each state. Though it is an open 
question as to how Eve can gain information under the above condition, calibration 
should be done locally. If single-photon states are used, Eve‘s strategy is restricted to 
being state-independent. Her operation is then restricted to unitary transforms and 
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is harmless. 
It is common that an apparatus is calibrated at the beginning of communication 
and this setting is kept through the working period. The idea of initial calibration 
assumes implicitly that the state of the apparatus is stable during quantum 
communication once the calibration is established. However, the apparatus state 
may change over a long time scale. In phase coding, for example, the phase shift in 
the modulators gradually changes for the same applied signal. The path length 
difference in the interferometer shifts according to the temperature. As a result, the 
photon state may wander over the Bloch sphere. Calibration is thus necessary 
during communication to compensate for the drift before the error of the devices 
become significant. Therefore, the devices should be stable so as to keep the period 
between the calibrations practical.  
Another issue arises from the drift and fluctuation of the channel. The security 
analysis assumes that the eavesdropping strategy is independent of time, so that we 
collect as large a number of events (data) as possible to improve the estimation of the 
channel properties or leakage of information to Eve. If the channel properties 
significantly change during data collection, the variance in the distribution increases 
with the cost of a large number of sacrificed bits. If we know of the absence of Eve, 
we can measure the drift and compensate for it (in this case we do not need 
cryptographic protocols at all.) However, if we assume Eve is in the channel, we need 
to consider that the measurement results are under her control. In practice, the drift 
of the optical fiber would be slow enough to collect sufficient data. This may become 
an issue for quantum communication between a low Earth-orbit satellite and the 
Earth. Transmission loss would change by 10 dB over a few minutes. The 
transmittance and relative phase would change with fluctuations in the position and 
direction of the satellite, fluctuations in the refractive index of the air (due to wind), 
and scattering by small particles. We need to develop a method for the efficient 
estimation of channel properties using only a small number of data. 
 
II – 3 – 5 Synchronization 
 
Besides the security proof, it is necessary to compensate fluctuations in an optical 
fiber set outside the system to achieve continuous operation. Environmental 
temperature changes, wind, and other environmental conditions can cause large 
fluctuations in the properties of optical fibers outside the system. The system should 
be equipped with bit/frame synchronization technologies, fault detection via the 
monitoring of the QBER, and a resynchronization mechanism. To modulate and 
detect photon signals with the correct timing, we transmit bit-synchronization 
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signals using wavelength division multiplex (WDM) technology. Since the 
bit-synchronization signal power is of ordinarily level, spontaneous emissions of 
laser diodes and nonlinear crosstalk from synchronization signals become a problem. 
We suppress the crosstalk using WDM filters and a synchronization signal power 
control. We compensate for the group velocity difference (GVD), which depends on 
the transmission line, between the quantum signal and the synchronization using an 
adaptive GVD compensation mechanism. Note that the clock and frame 
synchronizations do not provide any new information to Eve.  
Frame synchronization is indispensable for basis reconciliation and the following 
key distillation procedures. However, not all the source key bits that are launched 
from Alice reach Bob in the single-photon transmission, so we cannot apply 
conventional fixed pattern matching frame synchronizations such as those for 
SONET/SDH or Ethernet networks. Therefore, we introduce a flame pulse signal 
that is transmitted with a bit-synchronization signal using WDM technology and a 
QBER calculation method. The frame position is adjusted roughly by using the 
frame pulse signal and precisely by using the QBER calculation in the basis 
reconciliation procedure. We can establish frame synchronization by shifting the bit 
correspondence while monitoring the QBER until it is much less than 50%. In actual 
use, even if stable operation is established, we must prepare for accidental faults 
such as performance degradation caused by synchronization loss or eavesdropping. 
We introduce fault detection and distinction by QBER monitoring. We also introduce 
a resynchronization mechanism corresponding to the fault. When bit 
synchronization worsens, the QBER slowly degrades, and when frame 
synchronization loss occurs, the QBER rapidly degrades to over 50%. If the QBER 
degradation is a factor of the bit phase shift or frame phase shift, it would improve 
after resynchronization. If it does not improve, the fault is classified as a fatal error, 
which includes that caused by eavesdropping, and the key distribution is aborted. 
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Part III: Toward New Generation Quantum 
Cryptography 
It is generally said that there are at least two deep valleys in a route from 
invention to innovation. One is the Valley of Death between basic research and 
applied research. The other is the Darwinian Sea, in which industrial species need to 
be able to supply viable products and services to survive. QCT may have already 
crossed over the Valley of Death and is now in the Darwinian Sea. QCT should 
eventually be appreciated by those who have no knowledge of quantum theory. In 
the early stage of the Struggle for Life in the Darwinian Sea, a crucial issue will be 
how to embed QCT into photonic networks that are the basic infrastructure of the 
Internet society. A short-term strategy is to combine current QCT and photonic 
network technology with reasonable assumptions on nodes and compromises of the 
security level. The long-term strategy is to invent new schemes that enjoy the merits 
of all known protocols and to study and develop the quantum repeater to realize full 
quantum networking. The new paradigm may be referred to as New Generation 
Quantum Cryptography. The purpose of this part of the report is to discuss briefly 
the progression from short-term to long-term strategies toward New Generation 
Quantum Cryptography. 
 
III – 1 Photonic Network: a Post-IP Network 
 
The total number of digital subscriber line, cable, and FTTH subscribers to the 
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT) Group in Japan reached almost 
28 million by the end of September 2007. Of this total, the number of FTTH 
subscribers exceeded 10 million. Anticipating great changes, the NTT Group 
announced its Medium-Term Management Strategy in November 2004, pushing 
ahead with the construction of a NXGN (Next Generation Network). The NXGN will 
have an important part to play in society as a reliable social infrastructure. Today in 
the field of telecommunications, safety and security concerns extend from ensuring 
secure communications to the protection of personal information [Miura, 2008].  
At the frontier of optical communications, more advanced technologies are being 
exploited to realize a sustainable info-communication society that is safe and secure, 
even beyond the NXGN. The advanced technology of a photonic network adopts  
- multi-ary modulations of the amplitude and phase of light, 
- all-optical processing of signals, and 
- advanced optical switching.  
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Photonic network technology is expected to serve as a platform for the post-NXGN, 
which is referred to as the NWGN (New Generation Network). Various applications 
such as real-time video streaming, multipoint video communication, grid computing, 
digital cinema, sensor networks, and network games will be provided for by the 
seamless control of QoS on a photonic transport platform. The key technologies of 
the photonic transport platform consist of data-granularity-adaptive multi-QoS 
photonic transport, one-hop transparent links, and autonomously controlled 
power-minimum photonic networks.  
A paradigm of the NWGN consists of a service stratum and transport stratum 
with a management layer, evolving from legacy network architecture, and is called 
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI). OSI is standardized by ISO 7498 and consists 
of seven layers: from the bottom, the physical, data, network, transport, session, 
presentation, and application layers. There is no doubt that advanced optical 
switching and optical transmission will play more important roles in the transport 
layer of the NWGN. An urgent issue is to study how to ensure information security 
in such a network. This includes the protection of interests of those relying on 
information systems from failures of confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
[OECD]. 
QCT is one of the most promising solutions; however, its current performance 
needs to be dramatically improved for it to be applied to the NWGN, which requires 
a breakthrough technology. A practical solution should consist of diverse methods of 
combining photonic and quantum technologies to realize security in the physical and 
data layers. This is referred to as Secure Photonic Network technology.  
 
III – 2 How to embed QCT into Photonic Networks  
 
The security services and their mechanisms in the physical and data layers are 
summarized as follows [ISO 7498]. 
(1) Connection Confidentiality: the confidentiality of all user data on a connection. 
(2) Connectionless confidentiality: the confidentiality of all user data in a single 
connectionless session data unit. 
(3) Traffic flow confidentiality: the protection of information that might be derived 
from the observation of traffic flows; for example, the existence, amount, direction, 
and frequency of communication. 
Total encipherment of the data stream is the principal security mechanism in 
the physical layer and is provided by means of an encipherment device that operates 
transparently. The objectives of physical layer protection are to protect the entire 
physical service data bit stream and to provide traffic flow confidentiality. Another 
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mechanism for enhancing the security in the physical layer is route control that 
avoids vulnerable paths. Physical layer security mechanisms featuring in the 
photonic network are the technologies of the optical spread spectrum (optical code 
division multiplex, CDM) and QNRC (Y00).  
A mechanism has been proposed for confidentiality in the photonic network to 
realize the security service required in upper layers as follows. Client data 
transported in the router network are protected with symmetric-key cryptography, 
and the optical signal in the optical path network is protected with data 
encipherment using an optical CDM or QNRC. The secret key needed for both of 
these cryptosystems can be distributed by QKD. Physical layer cryptosystems are 
valid if the physical layer interface is provided to clients of the cipher service. The 
NTT Group has recently demonstrated field experiments on the virtual private 
network NetMeeting with Vernam‘s OTP cipher using a key generated by QKD. The 
system also has a function that acts against falsifications [Honjo et al., 2008].  
 
III – 3 New Generation Quantum Cryptography  
 
An appropriate starting point in the next phase of quantum cryptography is to 
integrate different kinds of quantum cryptoschemes into the test-bed of a photonic 
network. The schemes most suitable to photonic network technology are QNRC and 
CV-QKD schemes, both of which simply use the presence of quantum noise inherent 
in lightwave signals. They can be implemented with current technology and hence 
could be smoothly embedded into a photonic network although the distance of 
CV-QKD is limited to a few tens of kilometers owing to noise in the fibers. Such 
schemes may currently suit short-distance applications. Some sophisticated 
techniques or protocols need to be developed for longer-distance transmission. On 
the other hand, QKD schemes based on photon counting, say photon QKDs, still face 
many difficulties in combining with photonic network technologies. For example, 
how to cope with issues such as wavelength division multiplexing and routing is not 
trivial. This in turn offers the possibility of investigating new improved schemes.  
We wish to exploit all the advantages of these three schemes. For example, a 
multi-ary differential phase shifting format has better transmission performance, 
and it can be combined with photon and homodyne detectors to extract the full 
potential of the quantum effect. In parallel, we should develop quantum ―node‖ 
technology, which includes novel photon detectors, quantum repeaters, and quantum 
signal processing to extend the distance of the network. This would lead us to a New 
Generation Quantum Cryptography that could realize high-speed and secure 
communications on a photonic transport platform.  
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III – 4 QKD in Space 
 
Free-space quantum cryptography between a ground station and satellite is a 
possible solution for sending quantum information over distances further than what 
is possible using optical fibers since there is no birefringence effect in the 
atmosphere.  
The European Space Agency (ESA) plans to demonstrate a quantum key 
distribution experiment called Space-QUEST onboard the ESA Columbus module 
onboard the International Space Station. QKD employing entangled photons will be 
demonstrated using three optical ground stations in Europe. Therefore, there is the 
possibility for Japan to join the project by providing one of the optical ground 
stations for the global QKD. The National Institute of Information and 
Communications Technology (NICT) was invited to participate in the round table 
meeting held at the ESA and cooperation between the ESA and NICT was agreed for 
the proposal of Space-QUEST.  
In Japan, feasibility studies for space QKD have begun for the purpose of 
developing onboard space QKD terminals. There are two main protocols for the 
space QKD: the WCP with a decoy state (BB84) and quantum entanglement (E91). 
The onboard QKD terminals will have 125- and 100-mm-diameter telescopes. Space 
QKD will be possible under some conditions. It is most important to consider the 
potential users for such long-distance QKD in terrestrial QKD networks. 
 
III – 5 Quantum Repeaters 
 
The main obstacle in QKD is the limitation posed by the difficulty of transporting 
quantum information between distant nodes mainly caused by a dissipative and 
noisy channel as part of the photonic network. For quantum communication, we 
cannot use amplifiers before the signals dissipate in the channel because their 
operation destroys the original quantum information.  
One of the most important achievements in the field of quantum information is 
the discovery of schemes to overcome the limitation of using practical physical 
resources. Such a system is called a quantum repeater and it allows long-distance 
quantum communication over noisy channels. As is similar for classical repeaters, 
the photonic network channels are divided into several segments. At the ends of each 
segment, local operations are performed for the nodes. These nodes once ‗memorize‘ 
the quantum information in QKD and the photonics mediate the ‗connection‘ of these 
segments. Repeating appropriate operations for the nodes enables the expansion of 
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the connection and transmitting of photonic qubits over long distances. 
Quantum repeaters have so far been studied mainly for photon QKD because it is 
based on a simpler signal format. Several models of quantum repeaters for photon 
QKD have been proposed and some fundamental demonstrations have been 
experimentally performed in recent years. For practical application in photon QKD 
systems, it is desirable to realize a repeater that is a solid-state system, like a 
semiconductor. In such a system, electron and nuclear spins in the material work as 
nodes for storing the quantum information. Most semiconductor-based schemes for 
quantum logic rely on nearest-neighbor spin–spin coupling. At each node, photons 
and spins couple via waveguide structures in a semiconductor chip. An interface 
between the photons and spins is now being developed using microphotonic and 
nanophotonic technologies for high-speed networking. 
Some protocols for the repeaters are also under consideration for the nesting of 
the photonic network. A simple method is to use single-photons emitted from the 
semiconductor nodes. Because the emitted photons strongly correlate with the 
internal electron spins in the nodes, they act as mediators, and the interferences 
enable spin–spin coupling by the remotely separated semiconductor nodes. Another 
method is to communicate the nodes via coherent state laser pulses. The quantum 
information of distant electron spins is intermediated through the coherent-state 
laser pulse, and homodyne detection of the pulses projects the expected spin–spin 
coupling with high probability. Although some probability of errors is inherent in 
these protocols, the errors might be removed through quantum purifications 
protocols also operating at the nodes.  
A quantum repeater for CV QKD might be more involved. It requires ensembles 
with many degrees of freedom to store continuously modulated signals. Such a 
quantum repeater should also be useful in photonic network technology.  
The quantum repeater is essential for the next generation of QKD networks, and 
several approaches are in trial both experimentally and theoretically. Research and 
design of the quantum repeater should be an important strategic target in the next 
ten-year plan. 
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Part IV: Summary 
In this report, we have presented the starting point for the development of 
quantum cryptography. The main issues discussed were the standardization of 
quantum cryptography and the research and design for New Generation Quantum 
Cryptography.  
In Part I, we overviewed the current status of quantum cryptography, including 
theoretical and experimental achievements of both QKD and the QNRC. The QNRC 
is ready to be applied, or might have already been applied, to practical networks 
having a range of a few hundred kilometers. QKD needs further improvement for 
wider use but already has applications such as a Physically Secure Private Network 
over a short distance and random number sharing between mobile terminals.  
Part II was devoted to standardization issues, which mainly relate to security 
and interoperability. We first summarized the security specifications and 
requirements. To this end, most known protocols and schemes were described in 
terms of a) encoding schemes, b) signal transmission schemes, c) measurement and 
decoding schemes, d) classical communication, and e) status of the security proof. We 
then discussed how to define security in view of various levels of attacks and 
practical imperfections.  
We summarized the interoperability specifications and requirements. One is the 
interoperability between QCT and contemporary cryptographic systems and the 
other is that among quantum cryptosystems. Most of the former issues are left open 
for subsequent versions. For the latter, we put an emphasis on how to integrate 
different schemes into QKD networks. A seminal work of SECOQC is reviewed in 
this respect.  
Issues relating to test requirements were also discussed.  
In Part III, we discussed how to combine QCT with photonic network technology, 
and how to realize Secure Photonic Networks to sustain our future 
info-communication networks. A short-term strategy is to combine current QCT and 
photonic network technology with reasonable assumptions for the nodes and a 
compromise of the security level. The long-term strategy is to invent new schemes 
that have the merits of all known protocols and study and develop quantum 
repeaters that can realize full quantum networking. We referred to the new 
paradigm as New Generation Quantum Cryptography.  
The aim of this report was to provide an overview of issues in the efficient 
introduction of quantum information technology to secure our information 
technology society.  
Our philosophy in writing this report is that maintaining comprehensibility and 
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sustainability is essential in the efficient introduction of new technologies into the 
real world. Our intention was to promote comprehensibility and sustainability 
through discussions on standardization and new research and design in particular. 
With this in mind, we intend to partake in further activities. 
 
1. Continuation of the UQC working group: 
The working group will update the report to our best knowledge, giving the status 
of arts and trends.  
 
2. Contribution to related standardization activities: 
Updating the report so that it can be put into the existing schemes such as 
CRYPTREC, CC, and FIPS, we will contribute to related standardization 
activities via collaboration with modern cryptographic societies.  
 
3. Collaboration with academia: 
Collaborating with academia, we will suggest reasonable R&D plans for the 
further development of quantum information technology.  
 
We would sincerely appreciate any suggestions on and/or cooperation with our 
activities. 
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